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Using a panel of 40 EU and OECD countries for the period 1970–2010 we construct an 
early warning system. The system consists of a discrete and a continuous model. In the 
discrete model, we collect an extensive database of various types of economic crises 
called CDEC 40-40 and examine potential leading indicators. In the continuous model, 
we construct an index of real crisis incidence as the response variable. We determine the 
optimal lead employing panel vector autoregression for each potential indicator, and then 
select useful indicators employing Bayesian model averaging. We re-estimate the 
resulting specification by system GMM and, to allow for country heterogeneity, 
additionally evaluate the random coefficients estimator and divide countries into clusters. 
Our results suggest that global variables are among the most useful early warning 
indicators. In addition, housing prices emerge consistently as an important source of risk. 
Finally, we simulate the past effectiveness of several policy instruments and conclude that 
some central bank tools (for example, reserves) could be useful in mitigating crisis 
incidence.  
 
JEL Codes:   C25, C33, E44, E58, G01. 
Keywords:  Bayesian model averaging, dynamic panel, early warning 
indicators, macroprudential policies, panel VAR. 
. 
 
                                                           
* Jan Babecký: Czech National Bank, jan.babecky@cnb.cz  
Tomáš Havránek: Czech National Bank and Charles University, Prague, tomas.havranek@cnb.cz 
Jakub Matějů: Czech National Bank and CERGE-EI, Prague, jakub.mateju@cnb.cz 
Marek Rusnák: Czech National Bank and CERGE-EI, Prague, marek.rusnak@cnb.cz 
Kateřina Šmídková: Czech National Bank and Charles University, Prague, katerina.smidkova@cnb.cz 
Bořek Vašíček: Czech National Bank, borek.vasicek@cnb.cz 
An online appendix is available at: http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/en/node/372 
This work was supported by Czech National Bank Research Project No. C3/2011. The work was conducted 
within the framework of the ESCB Macroprudential Research Network (MaRs). We are grateful to MaRs 
colleagues and other country experts for their inputs into the CDEC 40-40 crises database. We thank Vladimir 
Borgy, Carsten Detken, Stijn Ferrari, Jan Frait, Michal Hlaváček, and João Sousa for their helpful comments. 
The paper benefited from comments at the CNB seminars, MaRs WS2 April 2011 workshop, and the First 
Conference of the MaRs Network, 2011. We thank Renata Zachová for her excellent research assistance. We are 
grateful to Inessa Love for sharing her code for the panel VAR estimation. We thank the Global Property Guide 
(www.globalpropertyguide.com) for providing data on house prices. The opinions expressed in this paper are 
solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of their institutions.  
   2  Jan Babecký, Tomáš Havránek, Jakub Matějů, 
   Marek Rusnák, Kateřina Šmídková, and Bořek Vašíček      
 
   
Nontechnical Summary 
The 2008/2009 economic crisis brought the early warning literature back into the spotlight. In the 
several past rounds of debate, this literature stream developed the concept of an early warning 
system (EWS) that should be able to identify various costly events, such as imbalances or 
financial crises, early enough for policy makers to reduce the costs. Despite noticeable progress in 
the theoretical and empirical literature on this subject in previous decades, the 2008/2009 crisis 
demonstrated that there is still ample room for improving the EWS. First, while initial early 
warning studies tried to offer tools to warn against currency and balance-of-payment crises in 
emerging economies, nowadays the research interest has shifted toward financial crises in 
developed economies. Second, the credibility of the initial EWS was not always sufficient for 
policy makers to act on warnings, owing to poor noise-to-signal ratios. Third, current risk factors 
may be very different, in particular due to the rising prominence of global factors and 
interconnections between market segments and countries. 
We contribute to the early warning literature in several ways. First, we focus solely on the 
developed economies. For this purpose, we build an extensive database of various types of 
economic crises (e.g. banking, currency, and fiscal) for a set of 40 EU and OECD countries over 
the past forty years at quarterly frequency. We point out that determining the exact dates of the 
crises (and in particular the exact timing of when the crisis is over) is a subject of substantial 
disagreement among the surveyed sources. We therefore construct a robust indicator by 
aggregating the sources, which include previous academic studies and our own survey of expert 
opinions from national central banks.  
Second, we try to build an EWS that consists of a more traditional ‘discrete’ model where crises 
are ‘yes/no’ events as well as a ‘continuous’ model designed to capture the real costs to the 
economy, where the key indicator is the incidence of crises in the economy measured in terms of 
output and employment loss and fiscal deficit (the latter is used to characterize countries’ 
propensity to opt for debt-driven growth). Both models have advantages and disadvantages. The 
continuous one does not require expert judgment of crisis occurrence and instead focuses on the 
real economic costs measured by data. Nevertheless, real costs are not necessarily immediate 
indicators of crises, but rather characterize the ultimate ‘measurable’ outcome in the economy. 
The discrete model is able to send a more straightforward signal to policy makers on when to act. 
On the other hand, the practical application of the discrete model is challenged by the need to find 
an optimal trade-off between false alarms (a warning was issued but no crisis occurred) and 
missed crises (no warning was issued and a crisis occurred). Therefore, to explore the best of both 
approaches, our EWS is represented by the two complementary models, which share a common 
set of potential leading indicators for the same group of countries.  
Third, we employ a number of advanced estimation techniques to build the continuous model. To 
our knowledge, most of them have not been applied in the early warning literature so far. In 
particular, we relax the common assumption of a fixed horizon at which the early warning signals 
are issued (a fixed horizon of two years is often used in the literature) and study the dynamic 
linkages between crisis incidence and leading indicators within the panel VAR framework. Using 
a rich set of leading indicators, we classify them into three categories: ‘early warning’ (one to    Early Warning Indicators of Economic Crises: 




three years), ‘ultra early warning’ (more than three years), and ‘late warning’ (less than a year). 
We argue that proper accounting for the time lags of leading indicators is important for building 
an early warning system. Furthermore, we contribute to the methodological aspects of model and 
variable selection for the EWS. While it is common practice in the early warning literature to use 
all available indicators based on the authors’ judgment and/or theory, we refine the selection of 
leading indicators using Bayesian model averaging (BMA). BMA is a procedure that selects a 
subset of the most likely empirical models, and consequently a subset of the most useful leading 
indicators of crisis, as the dependent variable from the extensive number of model specifications 
for crisis incidence. Unlike in the previous literature, where all insignificant indicators remain 
inside the EWS, we re-estimate the continuous model after removing indicators that have not been 
found useful by the BMA procedure. Finally, we use dynamic panel estimation techniques that 
allow cross-country heterogeneity to reveal the marginal impact of each selected leading indicator 
on crisis incidence. Moreover, cluster analysis is used to check the implications of country 
heterogeneity for our results. 
Our results show that the choice of model (continuous or discrete) as well as the choice of early 
warning indicators examined (all potential indicators or only the useful ones) matters for which 
factors are detected as the major sources of risk by the early warning exercise. Nevertheless, the 
importance of certain factors seems to be robust across different specifications. We find that rising 
housing prices and external debt are important national risk factors for both crisis occurrence and 
crisis incidence. The warning power of housing prices gains in prominence when we estimate the 
model without the indicators identified as unimportant by BMA. We also find that while housing 
prices are a useful warning indicator for all clusters of countries, the role of external debt is not 
homogeneous across the sample.  
Another substantial source of risk is represented by global factors, such as world credit growth 
and world output growth. These factors are important in both the discrete and the continuous 
model, although they seem to matter especially for the continuous model, describing crisis 
incidence. Again, their role in the EWS gains in prominence when the continuous model is re-
estimated with only the useful indicators (as per BMA) included on the right-hand side. 
Our paper concludes with an assessment of the efficiency of various policy tools that could be 
used to mitigate the impact of crises on the economy. The results show that certain policy 
variables may be significantly related to risk factors. However, major data limitations prevent us 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we construct an early warning system comprising two complementary models—a 
discrete one and a continuous one—for a panel of 40 EU and OECD countries over the 1970–
2010 period at quarterly frequency and sharing a common set of 50 potential leading indicators. 
While the discrete model serves to explain the occurrence of economic crises (binary ‘yes/no’ 
events), the continuous model captures the incidence of crises in the economy (in terms of output 
and employment loss and of fiscal deficits that are run to mitigate real costs).  
There are several contributions to the early warning literature. First, we estimate our discrete 
model for a broad panel of developed countries, including the EU-27, for which we build a 
comprehensive database called CDEC 40-40 that contains various types of economic crises, such 
as banking crises and currency and debt crises, for 40 countries over 40 years. The evidence of 
crises, collected both from the literature and from country experts, is aggregated into indicators 
robust to potential biases in individual sources. To our knowledge, the early warning literature 
focuses mainly on emerging markets or several selected developed countries and so the CDEC 40-
40 database is quite unique.  
Second, in the case of the continuous model, we determine the optimal lead in the panel-vector-
autoregression framework by examining the impulse responses of crisis incidence and potential 
leading indicators instead of following the early warning literature by assuming a fixed horizon 
for all early warning signals.  
Furthermore, we employ Bayesian model averaging in order to retain only those leading 
indicators that are useful for early warning. To our knowledge this is the first application of 
Bayesian model averaging to variable and model selection in the early warning literature. Next, 
we employ panel estimation techniques (including system GMM) to investigate the determinants 
of crisis incidence. As a sensitivity check, we relax another typical assumption used in studies 
dealing with cross-section or panel early warning models, namely, the hypothesis of common 
parameters. To allow for country heterogeneity, we employ two methods: the random coefficient 
estimator and clustering, which divides countries into subgroups. The results allow us to discuss 
the sources of risks to macroeconomic stability and, in particular, to compare the role of national 
versus global factors.  
Finally, using model simulations on historical data, we examine how efficient the selected policy 
instruments (among others, central bank reserves and the policy interest rate) were in mitigating 
crisis incidence in the economy. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates our design of the discrete and continuous 
model by identifying key lessons and challenges from the stock of early warning literature. 
Section 3 describes our approach to the construction of the data set and shows some stylized facts. 
Section 4 presents the discrete early warning model, followed by multinomial logit estimates of 
the determinants of crisis occurrence, and an assessment of model performance in terms of in-
sample and out-of-sample fit, loss function, and usefulness for policy. Section 5 is devoted to the 
continuous early warning model and presents the optimal lag selection upon panel VAR, the 
selection of variables employing Bayesian model averaging, dynamic panel estimations,    Early Warning Indicators of Economic Crises: 




assessment of model performance upon in-sample and out-of-sample fit, and sensitivity checks, 
including clustering. Section 6 outlines the main sources of macroeconomic risks and discusses 
possible policy reactions based on model simulations. Section 7 concludes. There are six annexes 
attached to the paper, containing data and methodological descriptions and selected empirical 
results. More detailed data descriptions and results are available from the online appendix 
(http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/en/node/372). The content of the online appendix is listed in the last annex 
to this paper. 
 
2. Early Warning Literature: Lessons and Challenges 
The recent financial crisis revived interest in the early warning literature among researchers as 
well as policy makers (Galati and Moessner, 2010; Trichet, 2010). The literature dates back to the 
late 1970s, when several currency crises generated interest in leading indicators (Bilson, 1979) 
and theoretical models (Krugman, 1979) explaining such crises. Nevertheless, it was only in the 
1990s—the first golden era of the early warning literature—when a wide-ranging methodological 
debate started, including studies on banking and balance-of-payments problems (Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1996) and currency crashes (Frankel and Rose, 1996). 
This methodological debate served as a starting point for the current stream of literature that is 
trying to build an early warning system for financial crises. Despite the extensiveness of the 
literature in the 1990s, the current research still needs to tackle four considerable tasks if this 
second generation of early warning models is going to help policy makers reduce the likelihood of 
future financial crises. 
First, in the 1990s, policy makers were mostly concerned with currency and twin crises, while the 
recent policy agenda also includes costly imbalances and global financial crises. The current 
research reflects the fact that policy makers would like to be warned about various events (IMF, 
2010) and proposes alternative dependent variables. For example, the signaling approach initially 
employed in the 1990s (Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart, 1998) has been used to predict costly 
asset price cycles (Alessi and Detken, 2009).  
Second, while the early warning literature of the 1990s was concerned primarily with developing 
economies that had suffered from currency or twin crises (Kaminsky, 1999), the current research 
looks typically at a large sample of developed as well as developing countries (Rose and Spiegel, 
2009) to reflect the international scale of the recent financial crisis. However, lessons for 
developed economies are rare. 
Third, the 1990s debate focused on currency and twin crises, which might have had different 
causes compared to the recent financial crisis. The current literature therefore searches for new 
leading indicators, which are also referred to as early warning indicators. Early warning indicators 
are typically selected from comprehensive databases that result from systematic reviews of 
available studies (Frankel and Saravelos, 2010) instead of narrower datasets matching selected 
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   Marek Rusnák, Kateřina Šmídková, and Bořek Vašíček      
 
   
Fourth, the 1990s methodology did not gain enough credibility to be transferable to the second 
generation of early warning models without significant modifications. Specifically, many studies 
reported too high noise-to-signal ratios to predict future crises credibly in the eyes of policy 
makers (Berg and Pattillo, 1998). The current research tries to improve credibility by using new 
techniques such as Markov switching (Peria, 2002; Abiad, 2003) and multinomial logit models 
(Bussiere and Fratzscher, 2006). In addition, it offers policy makers an explicit choice to pre-
select their preferences regarding missed crises and false alarms (Alessi and Detken, 2009).  
These four tasks to some extent correspond to the components of the early warning models 
(EWMs) that are being put forward as parts of the early warning system (EWS). The EWS refers 
to the class of empirical and theoretical works aimed at the early identification of various costly 
events, such as imbalances or crashes, in the economy. These works propose various EWMs that 
are built of several components. First, they specify which costly events they intend to warn 
against. Second, they select which countries should be incorporated into the EWMs, some EWMs 
being built for national economies and others for large samples of more than 100 economies. 
Third, they identify which indicators could potentially provide a useful early warning about these 
costly events. Fourth, they define time lags for these leading indicators in order to give policy 
makers some time to respond to the warnings issued by the EWMs. Fifth, they apply an empirical 
methodology—which may also include a specification of sufficient predictive power—to decide 
which potential leading indicators exhibit sufficient predictive power to be useful in the early 
warning exercise. Last, they include an either implicit or explicit methodology for dealing with 
policy variables, which has implications for the policy relevance of the EWMs.  
The early warning literature offers many useful lessons on how to approach these six components 
when building an EWM. However, important challenges still prevail. Some of them, such as the 
issues of a too heterogeneous sample and ad hoc time lag and indicator selection, we attempt to 
tackle in this paper. The literature survey presented below is organized around these components 
and challenges. 
 
2.1 Costly Events 
There are different types of costly events, such as currency crises, banking crises, and costly 
imbalances, for example on asset markets. Although the ultimate goal of each EWM is to warn 
against some (or all) of these costly events, there is no consensual approach in the literature on 
how to define them. Some studies specify costly events by directly measuring their real costs 
(Caprio and Klingebiel, 2003; Laeven and Valencia, 2008), such as loss of GDP and loss of 
wealth approximated by the large fiscal deficits that are run to mitigate the real costs. 
Alternatively, systemic events are identified as dramatic movements of nominal variables, such as 
large currency depreciations (Frankel and Rose, 1996; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999), stock 
market crashes (Grammatikos and Vermeulen, 2010), and rapid decreases in asset prices (Alessi 
and Detken, 2009). These studies either assume that systemic events are costly in real terms, 
citing stylized facts from previous crises, or select those systemic events which subsequently 
burdened the economy with real costs. The costly event is represented either by one variable 
(Frankel and Rose, 1996), or by several variables combined into one index (Burkart and Coudert,    Early Warning Indicators of Economic Crises: 




2002; Slingenberg and de Haan, 2011) with the use of alternative weighting schemes (equal 
weights, weights adjusted for volatility, or principal components). Some studies look at variables 
representing both real costs and dramatic nominal movements (Rose and Spiegel, 2009; Frankel 
and Saravelos, 2010).  
Another aspect of defining costly events is the scale of real costs or nominal movements. The 
scale can be looked at in either a continuous or a discrete way. The latter way, according to which 
crises are yes/no events, is more common in the early warning literature so far. Real costs or 
nominal movements correspond to a ‘yes’ value when their scale exceeds a certain threshold 
(Kaminsky et al., 1998). Alternatively, the coding can be taken from the previous literature. Under 
the discrete representation of crises, two main empirical approaches commonly applied are the 
discrete choice approach and the signaling approach. In the class of discrete choice models, the 
probability of crisis is investigated. A crisis alarm is issued when the probability reaches a certain 
threshold. The originally applied binary logit or probit models (Berg and Pattillo, 1998) have been 
replaced with multinomial models (Bussiere and Fratzscher, 2006) that extend the discrete choice 
from two (yes/no) to more states, such as crisis, post-crisis, and tranquil periods. Under the 
signaling approach proposed by Kaminsky et al. (1998), a crisis alarm is issued if the warning 
indicator reaches a certain threshold. The threshold can be defined based on the signal-to-noise 
ratio to minimize type I errors (missed crises) and type II errors (false alarms). 
Recently, continuous indicators of crisis have been proposed (Rose and Spiegel, 2009; Frankel 
and Saravelos, 2010) that allow the EWM to explain the actual scale of real costs or nominal 
movements without the need to decide whether the scale is sufficiently high to produce a ‘yes’ 
value. Another advantage is that continuous indicators do not suffer from a lack of variation of the 
dependent variable when too few sufficiently high values are observed in the data sample. 
Moreover, there is no problem with dating the exact start and end periods of costly events, a 
problem that is difficult to overcome in discrete approaches. The disadvantage of this approach 
lies in its limited capacity to send straightforward (‘yes/no’) signals to policy makers regarding 
the probability of crises. However, in the case of discrete indicators poor signal-to-noise ratios can 
limit this capacity as well. 
It follows that defining the dependent variable for an EWM involves a lot of judgment. One must 
select which type of costly events to include, whether to focus on their nominal or real 
manifestations, and—in the case of the discrete definition—where on the scale the threshold value 
is. It is therefore important to check that the choices made are appropriate. In some papers this is 
done by direct comparison with the dates of actual crises obtained from surveys (Louzis and 
Vouldis, 2011). Some of these surveys are available for large samples of countries (Laeven and 
Valencia, 2010).  
In our paper, we try to build an EWS consisting of a traditional EWM that relies on a discrete 
measure of costly events and a continuous EWM that departs from the stock of available literature 
in several aspects described in the following sections. The discrete EWM uses a crisis occurrence 
index that aggregates indices obtained from a survey of the literature and expert opinions as the 
left-hand side variable. This aggregated index takes the value ‘yes’ if at least two surveyed 
sources agreed on the occurrence of a costly event, such as a currency, banking, or fiscal crisis. 
The discrete EWM is used to exploit the possibilities of the traditional early warning literature in   8  Jan Babecký, Tomáš Havránek, Jakub Matějů, 
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the current EWS, mainly the possibility to send straightforward signals regarding crisis 
probability.  
The main focus of our paper is on the continuous EWM, which follows a more novel approach. 
For the purposes of this EWM, we define systemic stress as an event that is costly for the real 
economy in terms of high output loss, high unemployment, and/or a high fiscal deficit (caused by 
fiscal expansion that mitigates the recession). We follow this approach since maintaining output 
and unemployment at their potential levels could be viewed as policy makers’ ultimate objective. 
Also, this EWM reduces to some extent the judgment necessary to define the dependent variable. 
Specifically, it captures the consequences of any type of crisis for the real economy so there is no 
need to decide ax ante which type of costly events to consider. By looking directly at real costs, 
we avoid the problem of measuring which tail nominal events were costly. Moreover, there is no 
need to decide whether the scale is sufficiently high to produce a ‘yes’ value. The decision 
whether or not to act is left to the policy makers. There is one additional benefit of the continuous 
EWM. It supports policy makers in steering policy continuously instead of reacting only to very 
rare warnings issued by the discrete EWM. 
 
2.2 Countries in the Sample 
The literature of the 1990s was concerned primarily with developing economies that had suffered 
from currency or twin crises (see, among others, Kaminsky et al., 1998; Kaminsky, 1999). The 
recent literature has focused on the identification of crises and imbalances for large samples of 
countries, including both developing and developed economies (Rose and Spiegel, 2009; Frankel 
and Saravelos, 2010). Alternatively, attention has been given to developing countries and 
emerging markets (Berg et al., 2004; Bussiere, 2007; Davis and Karim, 2008) or the OECD 
countries (Barrell et al., 2009; Alessi and Detken, 2009).  
The assessment is typically done in a cross-section framework, under the assumption of 
homogeneity of the sample despite the fact that large samples of more than 100 countries are 
likely to form a rather heterogeneous group. Also, developing countries are not likely to be at the 
same level of convergence, and hence the homogeneity assumption might be too restrictive. The 
only exception is a set of studies focusing solely on the OECD group. In this case, however, the 
studies face the challenge of too few observed costly events in their sample (see Laeven and 
Valencia, 2010, to compare the frequency of costly events, such as currency crises and debt crises, 
in various countries). To sum up, there is a trade-off between a sufficient number of observed 
costly events and sample homogeneity. 
To our knowledge, studies focusing on the group of all EU-27 and OECD countries, for which the 
trade-off between observed costly events and heterogeneity is relatively favorable, and which are 
of more interest to European policy makers, are not available. Moreover, homogeneity tests of the 
sample—in terms of both indicators and their elasticities—are quite rare in the studies using large 
samples.  
To reflect that, we try to build both a discrete and a continuous EWM for a sample consisting of 
EU-27 and OECD countries only. Our panel consists of 40 developed countries taken from the    Early Warning Indicators of Economic Crises: 




EU-27 and OECD groups, from which Malta and Cyprus were excluded for most parts of our 
analysis due to data limitations. In addition, to see how sensitive our results are to the 
homogeneity assumption, we employ several techniques, such as cluster analysis and random-
slope modeling, which allow the estimated parameters for individual warning indicators to vary 
across countries. This approach might reduce the problems with finding at least some useful 
leading indicators reported by studies using large heterogeneous samples (Rose and Spiegel, 
2009).  
 
2.3 Potential Leading Indicators  
There are three approaches to determining which variables should be included among the 
potential leading indicators. First, some studies survey theoretical papers to identify potential 
leading indicators. These theory-based studies (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) usually work with 
a relatively narrow set of potential indicators, but sometimes this set is enlarged to include various 
transformations of the same data series (Kaminsky et al., 1998). Second, more recent studies often 
rely on systematic literature reviews. They scrutinize previously published research for useful 
leading indicators and create extensive data sets by including all detected indicators, and 
sometimes also various transformations thereof (Rose and Spiegel, 2009; Frankel and Saravelos, 
2010). Third, some studies take all the variables available in a selected database and add various 
transformations.  
All of these approaches are subject to the risk of missing important potential indicators. Theory-
based studies are limited in their search for indicators by a lack of theoretical models that are able 
to comprehensively capture the reasons for various types of crises and imbalances. Systematic 
literature reviews inherit various omissions from the surveyed research, unless they add indicators 
of their own. Studies relying on one database may miss indicators available elsewhere. 
Research that explicitly tackles the problem of non-available data series is very rare (Cecchetti et 
al., 2010). The recent crisis revealed that various financial indicators, such as liquidity ratios, 
might carry useful information regarding future costly events. Nevertheless, the data series needed 
to compute such indicators are not available, or are only available for some countries and limited 
time periods. For example, the ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets, credit to 
households, and the deposit-loan ratio for households are examples of variables that we could not 
include because of this problem.  
In our paper, we follow the second approach and rely on a systematic literature survey. 
Nevertheless, we strive to reduce the risk of missing important potential indicators from our 
analysis by adding potential leading indicators, such as the total tax burden and several global 
variables, according to our own judgment. In addition, we combine several data sources, such as 
International Financial Statistics, OECD, World Bank, BIS, and NIGEM.  
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2.4 Time Lags 
The common approach to determining the time lags of potential leading indicators in EWMs is 
expert judgment. Most EWMs simply assume that the appropriate time horizon to look at is one or 
two years (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). This assumption is rooted in stylized facts that 
describe how important economic indicators develop in the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis period 
(Kaminsky et al., 1998; Grammatikos and Vermeulen, 2010). The assumption is also related to 
the fact that most EWMs do not try to predict the exact timing of crises because it is too complex 
a task. Instead, they assess the likelihood of crises over a one-year horizon, given the currently 
observed values of all potential leading indicators.  
Such a time-lag assumption may be too limiting. Individual indicators may have completely 
different dynamics with respect to crisis occurrence, and so considering only their current values 
(and not lags) may yield suboptimal explanatory power for a given dataset. Therefore, we relax 
this assumption and we explicitly test for the optimal time lag for each potential leading indicator 
separately using panel vector autoregression. Once the one-year lag assumption is relaxed, it is 
possible to distinguish between several horizons that might be of interest to policy makers. 
Specifically, we can see which variables issue a ‘late warning’ for a 1–3Q horizon, which ones 
issue an ‘early’ warning for a 4–12Q horizon, and which ones issue an ‘ultra early’ warning for a 
13+Q horizon. We try to focus on the early warning and ultra warning horizons, within which 
policy actions still have a significant chance to reduce the likelihood of costly events.  
 
2.5 Early Warning Indicators 
The EWM is constructed from potential leading indicators to give the best prediction of the 
dependent variable. Studies using the discrete representation of the dependent variable and the 
signaling approach usually evaluate each indicator separately by minimizing either the signal-to-
noise ratio (Kaminsky, 1999) or the loss function (Bussiere and Fratzscher, 2008; Alessi and 
Detken, 2009). Alternatively, some studies combine potential indicators into composite indexes 
using judgmental approaches to select index components and computing thresholds for the 
corresponding variables simultaneously (Borio and Lowe, 2002). Studies applying the discrete 
choice approach and studies using the continuous dependent variable work with a set of indicators 
that is also transformed into an early warning index (EWI). The weights of the potential leading 
indicators are estimated, and insignificant indicators (with zero weight) remain part of the index.  
In the case of working with one early warning indicator, the challenge rests in choosing the 
threshold values above which the potential indicator (or composite index) should be used to form 
the EWM. The threshold values are determined ex ante by judgment or in line with previously 
published studies. Studies employing the discrete choice approach have to decide about the 
probability threshold. In the case of loss functions, a balanced trade-off between missed crises and 
false alarms has become the standard.  
Interactions between individual indicators pose another challenge. In the case of single-indicator 
EWMs, information about interactions is fully omitted. Although policy makers can use several 
EWMs in parallel, there is a risk of underestimating the probability of a crisis if more indicators    Early Warning Indicators of Economic Crises: 




are close to, but below, their individual threshold values (Borio and Lowe, 2002). In the case of 
composite-index EWMs, this risk is reduced to the extent possible, given the empirical 
methodology chosen. In the case of multiple-indicator EWMs, it is often the case that the model is 
estimated and many potential indicators that are insignificant remain part of the model. 
Consequently, various biases may reduce the predictive power of these models.  
The resulting EWMs are typically assessed according to their out-of-sample performance by 
comparing one- or two-year-ahead forecasts with the actual values. For example, when 20–30% 
of crises are predicted, the EWM may be considered well-performing. Also, traditional mean 
squared errors are used to judge the EWMs’ performance relative to naive models such as random 
walk. Sometimes the EWMs are also compared to a benchmark EWM selected from the available 
literature.  
In our discrete EWM, we work with an early warning index (EWI), as described above. The 
performance of this EWI is then tested using the noise-to-signal ratios and minimized policy loss 
functions (in the spirit of Alessi and Detken, 2009). Second, in the continuous EWM we employ a 
methodology that, to our knowledge, has not been applied in the early warning literature so far: 
Bayesian model averaging (BMA). BMA allows us to select the best performing combination 
from all combinations of potential indicators (and their lags, as explained above). Subsequently, 
we estimate the weights of the useful indicators that are part of the best combination and create 
the EWI. This EWI does not contain insignificant variables. It follows that this newly proposed 
approach has several advantages. It reduces the problem of neglected variable interactions faced 
by studies working with each indicator separately. Also, it eliminates judgment from the process 
of creating the index from potential indicators. To test both of our EWMs, we employ the pseudo-
out-of-sample evaluation technique. In both cases, we understand our early warning indicators as 
being identified risk factors that make countries vulnerable to crises rather than variables that will 
be able to forecast the timing of the next crisis. This is in the spirit of the early warning literature 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) and also in the spirit of the very few practical guides to 
conducting early warning exercises (IMF, 2010).  
 
2.6 Policy Variables 
The last component of the EWM relates to variables representing (or closely related to) policy 
tools such as two-week repo rates, foreign exchange reserves, structural fiscal deficits, and capital 
adequacy ratios. It is often the case in the literature that the approach to these variables is not 
explicitly explained. The implicit treatment of policy variables relates perhaps to the concept of 
the EWM itself. The function of the EWM is to issue warnings to policy makers that there is a 
risk of a costly event. Such warnings are often viewed as a yes/no type of information. It is not the 
aim of the EWM to propose preemptive policy actions that could eliminate this risk. Therefore, 
there is no need to pay closer attention to the transmission from the variables representing policy 
tools to the risk of occurrence of costly events.  
Most studies include policy variables among the potential leading indicators and test their early 
warning power in exactly the same way as they test other variables. In our EWM, we excluded 
variables that directly represent policy tools (such as 2W repo rates). Both the inclusion and the   12  Jan Babecký, Tomáš Havránek, Jakub Matějů, 
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exclusion of policy variables pose certain problems for the EWM. On the one hand, the exclusion 
of policy variables reduces the information content of the data set, since in some cases policy 
errors might have been among the factors contributing to the occurrence of costly events. On the 
other hand, the inclusion of policy variables reduces the potential for subsequent analyses. 
However, such analyses should be exploited as much as possible, given the ongoing debate about 
the usefulness of alternative macroprudential policy tools (as illustrated, for example, in Frait and 
Komárková, 2011). Specifically, by excluding policy variables from our EWM, we can test the 
responsiveness of the EWI to changes in policy tools. To eliminate the problem of reduced 
information content, we work with indicators that are closely related to policy tools due to fast 
transmission (such as 3M interest rates).  
It follows that we proceed in two steps with our analysis. First, we exclude variables representing 
policy tools from the potential indicators. Second, we explicitly model the impulse responses of 
the EWI to shocks in policy variables. This two-step approach gives us more options for further 
analysis. For example, we use the EWM to see which sources of risk (such as global variables or 
housing prices) are behind the anticipated costly event. We can then relate them to a certain 
category of policy tools and see how much they can affect the probability of the costly event. This 
type of information can be useful for policy makers, for whom the probability of a forthcoming 
crisis may not be sufficient information to prompt an adequate policy action. The recent crisis 
revealed that a lack of signals strong enough to prompt policy action could be a serious problem.  
Due to the Lucas critique, we do not propose that the EWM should be used to calibrate policy 
actions since their implementation could change the underlying relationships, thus making it 
inappropriate to infer from the past in order to assess the effects of the policy on the economy in 
the future. Nevertheless, we do propose that the EWM could be used to give more detailed 
information about the factors behind crises and potential policy solutions. Also, the Lucas critique 
could be mitigated if we consider ‘small’ (i.e., marginal) policy changes that are unlikely to affect 
the underlying relationships significantly. That is why we prefer continuous measures of costly 
events. Discrete indicators might lead to less frequent but more abrupt policy actions since they 
change value (between yes and no) less often than continuous indicators.  
 
3. Data Set and Stylized Facts 
As outlined in the previous section, there is a certain trade-off in the early warning literature 
between country coverage, the time dimension, the choice of variables, and data availability. One 
unique feature of our data set is that it focuses on a panel of developed countries which are 
members of the EU-27 and/or the OECD. In total, the data set covers 40 countries, listed in Annex 
I.1. Another feature of our data set is a combination of a large time dimension and a rich 
informational content. The sample covers the period from 1970 through 2010 at quarterly 
frequency and includes four categories of variables, namely, the discrete indicator of crisis 
occurrence, the continuous indicator of crisis incidence, potential leading indicators, and policy 
variables. Most of the data come from commonly available sources.     Early Warning Indicators of Economic Crises: 




3.1 Crisis Occurrence Index  
For the purposes of this study, we put together a Comprehensive Database of Economic Crises in 
40 developed countries over 1970:Q1–2010:Q4 (CDEC 40-40 henceforth). The CDEC 40-40 
captures several types of crises, including banking crises, currency crises, and debt crises, as 
reflected in the literature (Caprio and Klingebiel, 2003; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008; Laeven and 
Valencia, 2008 and 2010; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Kaminsky, 2006). We cross-check the 
crisis episodes identified by these papers using a comprehensive survey among experts mostly 
from central banks in all countries in the sample. The EU-27 survey was conducted as part of the 
ESCB MARS work.  
When collecting the data, we faced the following difficulties. First, while some studies identify 
crisis episodes if a certain variable or indicator exceeds its threshold value (e.g. Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999; Kaminsky, 2006), other studies (e.g. Caprio and Klingebiel, 2003; Laeven and 
Valencia, 2008) employ expert judgment or use systematic reviews. Second, it is easier in general 
to find information on the exact timing of the start rather than the end of a crisis, since the 
underlying crisis indicators typically return to their ‘normal’ levels only gradually. Third, in a 
number of studies the crisis episodes are recorded at yearly frequency, while our data set is built 
on a quarterly basis. Thus, some measurement error could occur during the transformation from 
yearly to quarterly frequency. Besides, for a number of countries—e.g. those which experienced 
economic transition from a planned to a market economy—the data only start at the beginning of 
the 1990s. 
Given these issues, we verified our data using a survey among country experts, mostly from 
national central banks. To limit various biases in the individual studies and survey responses we 
construct our discrete dependent variable—the Crisis Occurrence Index (COI)—by aggregating 
the sources in the following way. We record a positive event if at least two of the sources agree on 
the occurrence of a crisis (e.g. a country expert and at least one research paper, or at least two 
research papers). 
Due to the relatively low occurrence of the individual types of crises over the sample period, we 
code the COI equal to one if at least one of the four types of the crises occurred, and zero 
otherwise. Apart from the statistical argument for this approach, evidence from the literature 
suggests that crises are related; for example, it is well documented that currency crises often go 
hand-in-hand both with debt crises (Dreher et al., 2006; Herz and Tong, 2008) and with banking 
crises—so-called ‘twin crises’ (Kaminsky, 1999; Glick and Hutchinson, 1999). For illustration, 
the COI for the United Kingdom
1 is shown in Figure 1. A complete set of indices for the 40 
countries is provided in the online appendix. 
                                                           
1 In what follows, we use the United Kingdom to illustrate our results. We do so for a number of reasons: the 
developments in the UK are relatively well known, there are long time series available (and, importantly, crises 
occur along that time span), and the UK can be considered a representative country in terms of the size of its 
economy. Besides, due to space limitations, there is no way of reporting the results for all 40 countries of our 
sample. All these results are available in the online appendix at http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/en/node/372.   14  Jan Babecký, Tomáš Havránek, Jakub Matějů, 
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3.2 Crisis Incidence Index 
The Crisis Incidence Index (CII) is our continuous dependent variable which characterizes the 
consequences of any type of crisis for the real economy. Rose and Spiegel (2009) and Frankel and 
Saravelos (2010) use changes in GDP, industrial production, currency depreciation, and stock 
market performance to measure the incidence of the 2008/2009 crisis. We propose separating the 
nominal and real aspects and focusing on a real indicator of crisis incidence. Consequently, we 
construct the CII upon GDP growth, unemployment, and the fiscal deficit, by applying alternative 
weighting schemes. Since maintaining output and unemployment at their potential levels could be 
viewed as the ultimate objective of policy makers, a decline of GDP growth below, and a rise of 
unemployment above, the corresponding potential values characterize the costs for the real 
economy. The inclusion of the budget balance reflects a need to detect episodes where real costs 
have been prevented by fiscal deficits. Our definition is motivated by stylized facts according to 
which strong systemic events, such as the crisis of 2008/2009, are indeed characterized by a 
decline in output, a rise in unemployment, and large fiscal deficits that are run to mitigate the 
costs of the crisis.  
The CII used in our analysis is obtained as a simple average of three standardized variables: the 
HP-filtered gaps of real GDP, the unemployment rate, and the government budget surplus (the 
series definitions and data sources are reported in the first three rows of Annex I.3). Real GDP 
and the budget surplus enter with negative signs to the average, so that an increase in the CII is 
associated with higher costs for the real economy. The CII for the United Kingdom is shown in 
Figure 1, along with the COI. The CIIs for all 40 countries of the sample are illustrated in the 
online appendix. We also tried different weighting schemes (for example, principal components), 
but the results are qualitatively similar. 
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As can be seen on the example of the United Kingdom, there are relatively few episodes of (any 
type of) crises captured by the COI, while the CII exhibits much more variation over time. Visual 
inspection of Figure 1 suggests that there are episodes when the COI precedes the CII in time, but 
the link between the COI and the CII is not straightforward. Some surveyed sources defined 
banking and currency crises by looking at nominal variables only. It is likely that not every sharp 
movement in the nominal exchange rate was followed by a significant drop in economic growth. 
For example, there might have been a policy response from the national authorities preventing 
such a drop. Therefore, not every change in the COI is followed by a change in the CII. At the 
same time, not every increase in the CII is preceded by a crisis captured by the binary COI, since 
the economic downturn may have been, for example, imported from abroad as a result of 
weakening external demand.  
 
3.3 Leading Indicators 
As a starting point for the selection of useful leading indicators, we identified over 100 relevant 
macroeconomic and financial variables based on recent studies (e.g., Alessi and Detken, 2009; 
Rose and Spiegel, 2009; Frankel and Saravelos, 2010) as well as on our own judgment. We 
constructed a data set covering 40 developed countries over 1970–2010 at quarterly frequency. 
Since for a number of countries the data only start in the early 1990s, the panel is unbalanced. In 
order to address the trade-off between sample coverage and data availability, as a rule of thumb 
we excluded series for which more than 50% of observations were missing. Moreover, some 
series were strongly correlated, differing only in statistical definition, for example Reserves versus 
Reserves excluding gold. In such cases we kept only one variable (the one for which more data   16  Jan Babecký, Tomáš Havránek, Jakub Matějů, 
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was available). As a result, our data set consists of 50 potential leading indicators listed on rows 9 
through 58 in Annex I.3. The majority of the series were originally available on a quarterly basis, 
from the IMF’s IFS database. Some series were taken from the World Bank’s WDI database, 
available on an annual basis only. Such series were converted to quarterly frequency using the 
standard cubic match method. Fiscal indicators were collected from the NIGEM database. 
Property price indices were provided by the Bank for International Settlements and the Global 
Property Guide. We standardized all variables
2 and used their stationary transformations; see 
Annex I.3 for details and data sources. 
In order to facilitate the economic interpretation of the leading indicators in the subsequent text, 
we divide the individual variables into twelve groups: for example, monetary policy stance, 
capital market situation, and global variables. Annex I.2 shows the groups of variables; the 
classification of the individual variables into groups is provided in Annex I.3.  
 
3.4 Policy Variables 
In addition to the twelve groups, we keep a separate group of policy variables. Policy variables 
were not included among the explanatory variables of our empirical specifications linking crisis 
occurrence and/or crisis incidence to the set of 50 potential indicators. In fact, policy variables are 
assumed to influence the observed crisis incidence only indirectly, via the leading indicators 
discussed above. We will use the policy variables in the sixth section of the paper (policy 
simulations).  
 
4. Early Warning Indicators: A Discrete Model 
We begin our empirical analysis by assessing the determinants of the ‘traditional’ discrete 
indicator, the Crisis Occurrence Index, but on our new CDEC 40-40 database. This approach 
serves two objectives. First, such an analysis will allow us to extend the existing evidence from 
the early warning literature to a sample of 40 developed countries over the past 40 years. Second, 
evaluation of the COI will serve as a complementary EWM to the continuous CII-based EWM, 
conditional on the same common set of information (50 explanatory macroeconomic and financial 
variables listed in rows 9 to 58 in Annex I.3).  
 
4.1 Methodology: Dynamic Panel Logit Model 
Since the dependent variable—the COI—is binary, taking the value of 1 if at least two of the 
sources agree on the occurrence of a crisis, and 0 otherwise, we use the panel logit estimation 
                                                           
2 The standardization is done for each country separately and is carried out by subtracting the mean from the 
series and dividing the series by the standard deviation. Such standardization makes the regression results for 
each variable comparable, but does not affect the inference concerning the sources of risk.    Early Warning Indicators of Economic Crises: 




technique to be able to interpret the predicted values as the respective probabilities of crisis 
occurrence. The specification takes the following form: 
) ( t k t t X f COI ε β + = − , 
where X is the vector of 50 explanatory variables augmented with the lagged value of the COI to 
address the dynamics (we set the lag to 4; see more on the continuous case below), k is the lag 









z f . 
Following the common approach from the early warning literature, we choose a fixed lag length 
for this exercise. According to this approach, the probability of a crisis is assessed over the policy 
horizon, which typically equals two to three years ahead. Therefore, we set the lag length equal to 
8 and 12 quarters.  
The equation is estimated using maximum likelihood. The country fixed effects are used to avoid 
time-invariant country-specific endogeneity bias arising from omitted variables. The estimation 
results for the two lag lengths—8 and 12 quarters—are reported in Annex II.  
 
4.2 Results: Predicted Probabilities of Crises 
 
The dynamic logit model allows us to interpret the fitted values from the estimated equation as the 
probabilities of crisis occurrence at the horizons of 8 and 12 quarters. Among the variables 
significantly affecting the probability of a crisis, a low interest rate on credit and a rise in the 
amount of credit to the private sector increase the probability of crises at both the 8- and 12-
quarter-ahead horizons, suggesting a major role for the credit boom-bust cycle fuelled by low 
interest rates. The long-term government bond yield also turns out to be positively associated with 
the probability of a future crisis.  
Trade openness is found to consistently reduce the crisis probability. A solid external position of 
the economy contributes to stability as well. Somewhat surprisingly, the size of the tax burden 
does not reduce the probability of crises, possibly because there is not much space left for 
potential tax increases needed to mitigate a fiscal crisis. Strong global FDI flows signal 
confidence in the world economy and a low probability of crises occurring in the next 2–3 years. 
 
4.3 Assessment of Model Performance 
Next, we evaluate the model’s ability to predict a crisis—or, in other words, the quality of the 
early warning signals—at the horizons of 8 and 12 quarters ahead. The assessment is done in-
sample as well as out-of-sample. Given space limitations, here we present the results for the 
United Kingdom; the results for the full set of 40 countries are reported in the previously 
mentioned online appendix.   18  Jan Babecký, Tomáš Havránek, Jakub Matějů, 
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COI EW signal 8Q ahead EW signal 12Q ahead
 
Note: Actual values of the COI versus in-sample predicted values at the horizons of 8 and 12 quarters 
ahead. Crisis occurrence probability is on the vertical axis. 
 
The in-sample fit of the binary EWM can be seen in Figure 2. The COI denotes the actual 
episodes of crisis occurrence, while the other two lines show the predicted probabilities, which 
can be interpreted as early warning signals of crisis occurrence. The in-sample fit is quite high at 
both horizons; in fact, early warning signals sent 12 quarters ahead are somewhat more 
pessimistic compared to the 8-quarter horizon, as reflected in higher predicted probabilities of a 
crisis (including episodes when no crisis was recorded according to the actual COI). However, as 
is known from the literature, most of the early warning models have good ex-post explanatory 
power, while it is a common challenge to provide satisfactory out-of-sample early warning 
signals. 
To illustrate the out-of-sample predictive performance, we estimated the model on a sample up to 
the last quarter of 2006 and let the model perform an out-of-sample forecast for the period of the 
recent crisis. Figure 3 depicts the real-time early warning signals for the United Kingdom. For 
both the 8- and 12-quarters-ahead specifications the model was able to warn against the coming 
turbulence and the credit crunch of late 2007, signaling the probability of crisis occurrence as 
being 60% two years in advance and 95% three years in advance, respectively. In the case of the 
United Kingdom, the three-year-ahead early warning signal is more pessimistic overall, as can be 
seen from the figures showing the in-sample and out-of-sample fit. There is also an obvious trade-
off between missed crises and false alarm, to which we turn in the next subsection.  
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COI EW signal 8Q ahead EW signal 12Q ahead
 
 
Note: Actual values of the COI versus out-of-sample predicted values at the horizons of 8 and 12 quarters 
ahead. Crisis occurrence probability is on the vertical axis.  
 
4.4 Noise-to-Signal Ratio and Loss Function 
We follow the early warning literature and evaluate the overall performance of the binary EWM 
on the sample of 40 countries over 40 years by employing the noise-to-signal ratio (Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999; Alessi and Detken, 2009; and van der End, 2010, among others). Along with 
Alessi and Detken (2009), we believe that such a purely statistical criterion may not be sufficient 
for the evaluation of early warning models from the policy maker’s viewpoint, since it does not 
take into account the policy makers’ preferences regarding type I (missed crises) versus type II 
(false alarms) errors of crisis warning indicators. While Alessi and Detken (2009) assess the 
quality of individual variables as early warning indicators, we evaluate a single early warning 
index composed of 50 variables (a linear combination thereof), with weights taken from the linear 
probability model estimation.    20  Jan Babecký, Tomáš Havránek, Jakub Matějů, 
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The four possible combinations of warnings issued and crisis occurrence—denoted by letters A to 
D—can be illustrated using the following table: 
 
  Crisis occurred  No crisis occurred 
Warning issued  A (477)  B (268) 
No warning issued  C (100)  D (2,556) 
 
where the numbers in parentheses are our counts of the respective events in the whole sample, 
optimized for an equal policy makers’ preference weight between false alarms and missed crises 
(θ=0.5; details on the policy makers’ loss function will be given below). 







+ = , capturing the ratio of the share of  
false alarms (noise) to the share of correctly predicted crises (signal). Further, the Type I 
prediction error (missed crises) is defined as  C A
C
+  and the Type II error (false alarms) is defined 
as D B
B





C L + + − + = ) 1 ( θ θ , 
where θ is the parameter of relative importance of Type I errors. Realizing that the policy maker 
can always achieve a loss of min{(1- θ); θ } without using the early warning indicator (for θ>0.5 
the policy maker always reacts, while for θ<0.5 he does not react at all), we can define the 
usefulness of the indicator as  
) L( - }     );   - min{(1   θ θ θ .  
If the usefulness is positive, there is a positive benefit of using the proposed early warning 
mechanism. Figure 4 shows the share of Type I (missed crises) versus Type II (false alarms) 
errors for the whole sample of 40 countries over 40 years, along with the optimal trigger value of 
the early warning indicator from the 8-quarter-ahead linear probability model.    Early Warning Indicators of Economic Crises: 
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For every value of the preference weight, we find the optimal trigger value of the early warning 
indicator by minimizing the loss function. If the indicator exceeds the trigger value, the signal 
should be issued (and the policy response executed). When the policy maker has a weak 
preference against missed crises, the trigger is high, as is the share of missed crises. With 
increasing preference weight, the trigger falls and the initially low share of false alarms is traded 
off against the share of missed crises. 
Finally, Figure 5 shows the trade-off between the noise-to-signal ratio and the loss function in 
terms of the so-called usefulness indicator established in the early warning literature (Alessi and 
Detken, 2009). In our EWM, estimated on the whole sample of 40 countries, usefulness achieves 
its maximum when false alarms and missed crises are viewed as equally harmful. The usefulness 
of the discrete EWM takes a value of just above 0.35, meaning that it is possible to avoid over 
35% of the loss coming from missed crises and false alarms by using the EWM. For comparison, 
Alessi and Detken (2009) report a usefulness of single-variable indicators of around 0.2–0.25 for 
the same preference schedule. We conclude that using the composite early warning index reduces 
the loss by around 10% in comparison to single-variable indicators. 
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Note: Calculated for the 8-quarter-ahead early warning indicator. 
 
5. Early Warning Indicators in the Continuous Model  
5.1 Optimal Lag Selection upon Panel VAR 
Expert judgment is commonly applied in the early warning literature in order to set the horizon at 
which leading indicators send a warning of a potential crisis. In our evaluation of the CII, we relax 
this assumption and perform an explicit test for the optimal time lag, employing the panel vector 
autoregression (PVAR) framework developed originally by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) for 
disaggregated data with a limited time span and a larger cross-sectional dimension. PVAR departs 
from traditional VAR estimation in the sense that it deals with individual heterogeneity potentially 
present in the panel data. In particular, it allows for nonstationary individual effects and is 
estimated by applying instrumental variables to quasi-differenced autoregressive equations in the 
spirit of Anderson and Hsiao (1982). The advantage of this approach is that it allows for complex 
dynamics and accounts for potential bi-directional causality between the CII and potential leading 
indicators.  
We apply PVAR on the variable pairs represented by the CII and each of the 50 potential leading 
indicators available. Orthogonalized impulse-response functions are then used to determine the 
optimal horizon at which leading indicators warn about a crisis. Observing the response of the CII 
to a shock in each potential indicator, we set the lag of each indicator equal to the lead where the 
response function reaches its maximum with no prior on its response sign and no consideration of    Early Warning Indicators of Economic Crises: 





3 In addition, we allow for a minimum lag length of four quarters, 
assuming that a variable only provides an early warning if it predicts crisis incidence at least one 
year ahead so that timely policy action can still be taken. The estimation is performed by the 
GMM using untransformed variables as instruments.
4 While the optimal VAR lag length in a 
standard VAR can be determined by statistical criteria, this is not straightforward for PVAR due 
to cross-sectional heterogeneity. Balancing the need to allow a sufficient number of lags given the 
nature of the EWS exercise and to try to avoid over-parametrization, we set the number of lags to 
eight. The error bands are generated by a Monte Carlo simulation with 500 repetitions (Love and 
Zicchino, 2006). 
The impulse-response analysis determined the leads of all the tested variables between 4 (our 
threshold value for a variable to qualify as an early warning) and 16 quarters. The exact selected 
lag length for each variable is shown in Table A1 in Annex IV.2. To illustrate the lead selection 
logic, three examples of impulse responses are reported in Figures 6 to 8 below. Each figure 
corresponds to the bivariate PVAR consisting of the CII and one selected leading indicator, 
specifically, the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER), world inflation (WINF), and house 
prices (HOUSPRIC). A full set of impulse responses for all leading indicators is available in the 
online appendix. 
For the NEER we observe that the maximum response of the CII to a one-standard-deviation 
shock to the NEER (an increase means domestic currency appreciation) appears within 3 quarters 
and is negative; i.e., domestic currency appreciation reduces crisis incidence, and currency 
depreciation increases crisis incidence correspondingly (Figure  6). Nevertheless, as noted 
previously we assume that a variable qualifies as an early warning indicator only if it points to a 
crisis at least one year ahead. Moreover, the negative sign of the CII response to a positive shock 
to the NEER suggests that it is rather a short-term effect in the run-up to the crisis. In particular, 
the fact that the domestic currency is on a depreciation path a few quarters before the peak of the 
crisis represents a late rather than an early warning. Consequently, for an early warning we make 
use of the other CII response peak with a positive sign (domestic currency appreciation implies in 
the long term an increase in crisis incidence) and we set the lag of the NEER equal to 12.  
A similar logic applies to the lag selection for world inflation (WINF, Figure 7) and we set the lag 
equal to 14, where the response function takes on a maximum value behind our minimum 
threshold of 4 quarters. In this case, a shock to world inflation increases the incidence of crises 
(see also Section 6 on policy simulations). Given that world inflation potentially predicts the CII 
with a lead of more than 12 quarters, it can be considered a candidate as an ultra-early warning 
indicator.  
                                                           
3 The coefficient estimates and the impulse-response functions are conditioned on the variables included in the 
PVAR and, given the Choleski decomposition, also on the ordering of the variables. Given that PVAR estimates 
an elevated number of coefficients and there are numerous potential crisis indicators, they had to be included one 
by one. Nevertheless, the omission bias is in principle controlled for by including several lags of the CII, which 
arguably trace the effects of omitted variables. We tested ordering where the CII appears in the system before 
each potential crisis predictor but failed to find any different pattern. 
4 The Helmert-transformed variables are orthogonal to the lagged regressors and the latter can be used as 
instruments for the GMM estimation.   24  Jan Babecký, Tomáš Havránek, Jakub Matějů, 
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Last, the maximum response of the CII to a shock to housing prices appears within 5 quarters and 
is negative, indicating that an increase (decrease) in housing prices reduces (increases) crisis 
incidence. In other words, housing prices start decreasing sharply before the peak of a crisis and 
can be potentially considered an early rather than an ultra-early warning indicator. 
We also performed alternative robustness checks such as estimating the model with a subpanel of 
G7 countries where the data series are longer, as well as excluding these countries, but failed to 
find any systematic differences in terms of the impulse-response functions. 
 
Figure 6: Impulse Responses for Bivariate Panel VAR (NEER, CII) 
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Figure 7: Impulse Responses for Bivariate Panel VAR (WINF, CII) 
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Figure 8: Impulse Responses for Bivariate Panel VAR (HOUSPRIC, CII) 
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5.2 Selection of Useful Indicators Employing Bayesian Model Averaging 
As the discussion of the literature relating to early warning systems in Section 2 suggests, there is 
large uncertainty about the correct set of variables that should be included in a credible EWM. 
Consequently, there is a need to account systematically for this model uncertainty. In the presence 
of many candidate variables, traditional approaches suffer from two important drawbacks (Koop, 
2003). First, putting all of the potential variables into one regression is not desirable, since the 
standard errors inflate if irrelevant variables are included. Second, if we test sequentially in order 
to exclude unimportant variables, we might end up with misleading results since there is a 
possibility of excluding the relevant variable each time the test is performed. A vast literature uses 
model averaging to address these issues (Fernandez et al., 2001b; Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004; 
Durlauf et al., 2008; Feldkircher and Zeugner, 2009; Moral-Benito, 2010). Bayesian model 
averaging takes into account model uncertainty by going through all the combinations of models 
that can arise within a given set of variables. Further details are provided in Annex IV.  
Our dependent variable in the Bayesian model averaging exercise is the crisis incidence index as 
defined above. We use the whole sample of countries and include all of the 50 potential leading 
indicators described in Section 3. In addition, we include the fourth lag of the dependent variable 
in order to control for persistence of crises in time. In what follows we present the results for the 
main model when the lags of the variables are chosen according to the results of the PVAR 
discussed in the previous subsection. In principle, we could skip the first step and choose the 
appropriate lags within the BMA model. However, a number of issues would arise. First, since 
BMA weighs the models according to their fit and the number of variables included, it does not 
account for the potential multicollinearity of different lags of the same variable. This might be less 
of an issue for a pure forecasting exercise; however, it hinders any structural interpretation.
5 
Second, including a number of lags for each variable would yield an enormous model space even 
by model-averaging standards (e.g. including 16 lags of each variable would yield 2
800 possible 
models). Third, we could also attempt to choose from the models where only one lag from each 
variable appears; nevertheless, to our knowledge there are no available off-the-shelf algorithms 
that would allow us to do this in a straightforward manner. The last reason for choosing the 
optimal lag length within the PVAR framework is that BMA would not allow dynamic 
interrelations between the variables. For all these reasons we decided to use the two-step strategy. 
In addition, as a sensitivity check we performed two more sets of BMA estimations, namely, 
when all the variables are lagged by three years, and when the lag length for all variables is set to 
six years.  
                                                           
5 Cuaresma and Slacik (2009) consider different lags in their currency crisis forecasting BMA exercise. 
However, the variables included are not associated with any structural interpretation.    Early Warning Indicators of Economic Crises: 




Figure 9: Inclusion of Variables in 1,000 Best Models in Exact Lag Dynamic Specification 
Model Inclusion Based on Best  1000  Models
Cumulative Model Probabilities




















































Table A1 in Annex IV.2 presents the results for the first exercise. For each variable, we report its 
posterior inclusion probability, posterior mean, posterior standard deviation, and conditional 
posterior sign (the posterior probability of a positive coefficient conditional on its inclusion). The 
correlation between the analytical posterior model probability (PMP) and the PMP from the 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo Model Comparison (MC
3) method for the 5,000 best models is higher 
than 0.99, suggesting sufficient convergence of the underlying algorithm. Out of the 50 
explanatory variables, 23 have a posterior inclusion probability higher than 0.5; we retain these 
variables. The results are discussed in more detail below, when we perform the frequentist check 
of the BMA exercises, but it is worth noting that all the global variables are important, which 
might partly capture the contagion of crises. 
Figure 9 reports the best 1,000 models arising from the main model. The models are ordered 
according to their posterior model probabilities, so that the best model is the one on the left. The 
blue color indicates a positive coefficient, the red color indicates a negative coefficient, while the 
white color indicates that the variable is not included in the respective model. Figure 9 shows that   28  Jan Babecký, Tomáš Havránek, Jakub Matějů, 
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most of the model mass includes variables that have a posterior inclusion probability (PIP) higher 
than 0.5. 
Tables A2 and A3 in Annex IV.2 present the results for the two alternative specifications with a 
fixed lag length set to 3 years and 6 years, respectively. The convergence is satisfactory as the 
correlation between the analytical and MC3 PMPs is higher than 0.99 for both exercises. Note that 
the results relative to the exact lag specification are different to a large extent. The number of 
variables that have a PIP higher than 0.5 is 12 if we use the variables lagged by 3 years. 
Interestingly, variables belonging to the group of housing prices experience a drop in PIPs. When 
using the variables lagged by 6 years, only 11 of the potential variables have PIPs higher than 0.5. 
Notice that for this ultra long lag length, global variables turn out to be the most important in 
explaining crisis incidence. The development of global variables could thus be informative for 
crisis incidence even at the horizon of six years.  
 
5.3 Dynamic Panel Estimations 
We opt for dynamic panel estimations since the dependent variable—the CII—is time dependent. 
Given that crises are time-persistent, past realizations of the CII turn out to be significant 
determinants of the contemporaneous CII values according to our BMA exercise. We set the lag 
of the dependent variable equal to 4, consistently with the logic that an early warning must be 
issued at least one year ahead. Notice that our empirical specification has one important 
refinement compared to the existing studies. While it is common practice to use all available 
indicators, some of them being insignificant, we construct our model based on the pre-selected 
variables which are the outcome of the BMA.  
We start with a fixed effects specification as a natural benchmark for the panel framework. 
Nevertheless, since we employ a dynamic panel data model, the simple fixed effects estimator 
may deliver incorrect results. In dynamic panels the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand 
side is correlated with the error term; this is called dynamic panel bias (Nickell, 1981). Moreover, 
with the macroeconomic data we use, no regressors can be expected to be strictly exogenous, and 
the possible endogeneity should be taken into account. We treat all regressors as predetermined, 
because they enter the regression with lags (predetermined variables are independent of current 
disturbances but influenced by past ones).  
To tackle both the dynamic panel bias and the possible endogeneity of regressors, we employ the 
system generalized method-of-moments estimator (GMM) developed by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The system GMM is a refined version of the difference 
GMM (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988; Arellano and Bond, 1991), allowing for greater estimation 
efficiency. Because our data set involves many time periods and regressors, we only use up to two 
lags of regressors as instruments and collapse the instrument sets to avoid proliferation of 
instruments. Moreover, because our data set is unbalanced, we use orthogonal deviations for the 
system GMM in order to maximize the sample size. It should be noted, however, that the dynamic 
panel bias dwindles with increasing time span of data, and with 160 quarters in our data set the 
bias is likely to be quite small (Roodman, 2009). Also, the endogeneity problem should not be too 
serious since the shortest lag we use on the right-hand side of the regression is four quarters.    Early Warning Indicators of Economic Crises: 




Despite these caveats that point in favor of the simple fixed-effects model, we believe that the 
system GMM is a useful robustness check. 
As another sensitivity check, we allow for cross-country heterogeneity in the estimated 
parameters. Although our database only includes OECD and EU countries, and is thus 
substantially more homogeneous than the data set used, for example, by Rose and Spiegel (2009) 
and Frankel and Saravelos (2010) to explain crisis incidence, it would still be interesting to allow 
the coefficients on the individual warning indicators to vary across countries. To achieve that, we 
employ the mixed-effects multilevel estimator with random effects for each coefficient in the 
regression: 
CIIit = αi + (β + βi)CIIit-4 + (γ + γij)Xijt + δSkt + uit, 
where βi and γij are country-specific, normally distributed random effects. Again, considering the 
large number of regressors, we have to collapse the number of coefficients to be estimated in the 
random-effects part of the specification. Therefore, we restrict all variances of random terms to be 
equal and all covariances to be zero. The resulting model is estimated by restricted maximum 
likelihood, which is more suitable for unbalanced panels than the usual generalized least squares 
method (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2009). The assumption underlying the aforementioned 
specification is that the random effects are uncorrelated with the remaining regressors. While this 
is a strong assumption, it is difficult to test in this setting. Thus, large differences between the 
results of the mixed-effects multilevel model and the simple fixed-effects model may indicate 
either heterogeneity across countries in our sample or improper identification of the multilevel 
model. 
Another way of tackling the problem of possible country heterogeneity is to divide the countries 
into several groups and then run the simple fixed-effects regression separately for each group. A 
systematic method for dividing the countries into groups is clustering. The goal is to create groups 
of countries that may be expected to share similar slope coefficients in the early warning exercise. 
Because it is difficult (and arbitrary) to select one dimension that would define country similarity 
in this respect, we use all the variables in our data set that are available for all 40 countries (the 
variables are used in a standardized form so that every variable has the same weight). The 
common clustering method is the hierarchical approach, which begins with each country 
considered as one group, then continues with combining the closest two groups, and again—until 
one general group comprising all countries is formed. There  are  many  methods  for  determining 
which groups are the closest ones, and therefore which groups should be merged at each step. One 
of the most appealing approaches is Ward’s method (Ward, 1963), which merges the two groups 
that lead to the minimum increase in the error sum of the squares of the differences across all 
dimensions; in this respect, Ward’s method is similar to ordinary least squares.  
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Figure 10: Clusters of Countries in our Sample 
 
 
The results of the clustering exercise are depicted in Figure 10, and it is readily apparent that two 
main groups of countries are formed. Despite a few exceptions, Group 2 consists primarily of 
large, developed countries (the ‘core’ of the OECD and the EU), while Group 1 consists primarily 
of smaller or less developed countries. Countries inside these groups may be more homogeneous 
in terms of possible early warning indicators. Notice that although it is technically possible to 
form as many clusters as the number of countries in the sample, it is ultimately the researcher’s 
choice of the optimum number of clusters given the trade-off between the number of clusters and 
the degrees of freedom available for the estimations. We present results for two clusters in 
addition to the results for all countries.  
In our baseline specification the lags of the warning indicators are set upon the PVAR reported 
earlier; the results are reported in Table 1 and all three robustness checks (fixed effects, system 
GMM, and random coefficients) are broadly consistent with each other. The similarity of the 
estimated coefficients obtained by alternative methods suggests that potential endogeneity of the 
regressors is not likely to be an issue. In addition, it should be noted that the signs of all the 
estimated coefficients are consistent in the panel and the BMA estimation as well as in the 
impulse response function (at the selected horizon) from the PVAR. This also rebuts the issue of 
potential omission bias in the bivariate PVAR. In fact, examination of the impulse responses upon 
the PVAR brings extra information on how the effects of each selected variable change over time 
(from ‘ultra early warning’ to ‘late warning’). The main differences in the results of the 
specifications reported in Table 1 emerge between the two clusters of countries. While residential 
capital formation is important for Cluster 1, it is not important for Cluster 2 (the ‘core’ countries). 
The worldwide inflow of FDI and trade is a significant warning indicator of crisis incidence for    Early Warning Indicators of Economic Crises: 




the core countries, but not for the countries included in Cluster 1. The same applies for the money 
market rate, domestic private credit, the term spread, aggregate asset prices, and the nominal 
effective exchange rate. On the other hand, M3 is important for the countries in Cluster 1, but not 
for the core countries. Our models are able to explain approximately 40% of the variation in the 
Crisis Incidence Index. 
Table 1: Warning Indicators for Crisis Incidence (Lags Set upon PVAR)  




































































































































s1  -0.0541 0.00913 -0.0735 -0.365
* 0.126 
s2 0.137  0.157
*** 0.134  0.0440 0.247
* 




* 0.132  -0.333
*** 
Observations  3558 3558 3558 1360 2198 
Countries  38  38  19  19 
R-squared  0.371    0.399  0.377 
Note:
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001. Response variable: hp_cii. We select lag length using PVAR and 
only include variables with inclusion probability from BMA higher than 50%. 
 
It may be argued that a warning four quarters before the crisis (for some variables) is not 
sufficiently ‘early’. For this reason, we also provide results of the model where all the lags of the 
warning indicators are set to three years (Table 2). Similarly to the previous case, we first run the 
BMA exercise and only select variables with an inclusion probability higher than 50%. Once 
again, the results of our robustness checks are consistent with the results of BMA.    32  Jan Babecký, Tomáš Havránek, Jakub Matějů, 
   Marek Rusnák, Kateřina Šmídková, and Bořek Vašíček      
 
   
Table 2: Early Warning Indicators for Crisis Incidence (3 years) 

























































































* -0.0766  -0.403
*** -0.342
** -0.177 
Observations  3488 3488 2834 1393 2095 
Countries 38  38    19  19 
R-squared  0.301    0.319  0.303 
Note:
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
Response variable: hp_cii. We only include variables with inclusion probability from BMA higher than 50%. 
 
Because we model crisis incidence for the real economy, we also provide the results of an ‘ultra 
early-warning’ exercise where all lags of the indicator variables are set to six years. It is 
interesting to note that global variables are especially important in this case (Table 3).  
Table 3: Ultra Early Warning Indicators for Crisis Incidence (6 years) 
































































s1 0.0929  0.0899  0.109  0.284  -0.00321 
s2 0.0927  0.0900  0.0753  0.164  0.0327 
s3 0.200  0.196
*** 0.203  0.308  0.139 
_cons -0.0215  -0.00829  -0.00151  0.0848  -0.0316 
Observations 3337  3337  3337  1210  2127 
Countries 40  40    21  19 
R-squared 0.269      0.279  0.274 
Note:
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
Response variable: hp_cii. We only include variables with inclusion probability from BMA higher than 50%.    Early Warning Indicators of Economic Crises: 




5.4 Assessment of Model Performance 
In the next step we construct an Early Warning Index (EWI) from the fitted values of our model. 
We select the random coefficients model for this exercise and also add the extracted random 
effects to the estimated slope coefficients for each country; consequently, the index becomes 
country-specific. The EWI in quarter t can be interpreted as the prediction of crisis incidence for 
quarter t observed one year before. 
Figure 11 illustrates the in-sample fit of the EWI for the United Kingdom. It compares the EWI 
with a simple autoregressive function of the CII; it is readily apparent that the additional 
indicators included in the EWI significantly improve the prediction accuracy. The figures for 
other countries, available in Annex V (the four biggest European economies and the four Visegrad 
countries), allow for similar inference. The EWI was able to predict quite precisely the incidence 
of the last two recessions (the early 2000s recession and the one related to the recent crisis), while 
it failed, for example, to predict the magnitude of the 1973–75 recession. A possible explanation 
is that the causes of this crisis (an oil shock and the Vietnam War, among others) were too 
different from the rest of the sample.  










1970q1 1980q1 1990q1 2000q1 2010q1
date
Crisis Incidence Index Early Warning Index
AR(4) CII
 
While the in-sample fit of the EWI is satisfactory, the out-of-sample performance of the model 
may be quite different. We conduct a pseudo-out-of-sample forecasting exercise and focus on the 
recent crisis. The model is re-estimated using data till 2007Q1, which means well before the real 
economy began to feel the latest crisis. The results for all specifications are summarized in Table 
4; most variables hold their signs and only a few have now lost their statistical significance. To be 
specific, it appears that foreign liabilities, residential capital formation, oil prices, and world trade 
were more important for the recent crisis than for previous crises in our data set.   34  Jan Babecký, Tomáš Havránek, Jakub Matějů, 
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Out-of-sample forecasting performance is not the focus of this paper, because, among other 
things, some of the variables included in the EWI are not available in real time and thus cannot be 
used for forecasting. The purpose of the exercise is merely to show that our model can be 
expected to perform better than a naïve estimate, the simple autoregressive process of the CII. The 
pseudo-out-of-sample forecast for the case of the United Kingdom is depicted in Figure 12.
6 Even 
out-of-sample, the model is able to capture the beginning of the crisis in the real economy in 2008 
and predicts the magnitude of the crisis quite well, as opposed to the simple autoregressive 
function of the CII. The picture is similar for other countries, reported in Annex V. In all cases the 
EWI seems to perform better than the simple autoregressive function.  
Table 4: Warning Indicators for Crisis Incidence (Exact Lags, Data till 2007Q1) 







































** 0.115 0.0738  0.199
*** 







L5.st_foreignliab 0.0763  0.00263  0.101  0.235
* -0.0276 




























* 0.125 -0.101  0.155
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*** 0.136  0.0989 0.248
* 
s3  0.0903 0.0712 0.0459 -0.0657 0.182 
_cons -0.201
** -0.248
*** -0.133  0.0447 -0.351
*** 
Observations  3015 3015 3015 1086 1929 
Countries  38  38  19  19 
R-squared  0.318    0.305  0.343 
Note:
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
Response variable: hp_cii. We select lag length using PVAR and only include variables with inclusion probability 
from BMA higher than 50%. 
 
 
                                                           
6 Note that the selection of variables is performed taking into account the whole sample. A proper out-of-sample 
forecast would require both the selection and the estimation to be performed only on the pre-2007Q1 part of the 
sample.     Early Warning Indicators of Economic Crises: 
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6. Tentative Inputs into the Macroprudential Policy Debate 
In this section, we outline how the early warning system (EWS) consisting of our two EWMs can 
input into the macroprudential policy debate. We can see two possible inputs. First, the EWS can 
be used to identify the main sources of risk. As a result, policy makers could incorporate the 
useful early warning indicators identified by the two EWMs into their risk dashboards (Trichet et 
al., 2011). Should the risk dashboard warn against large nominal volatilities as well as costly 
events, indicators from both EWMs could be considered. Second, potential policy responses to 
early warnings can be assessed. This assessment can only be done very broadly due to data 
limitations. However, it can provide guidance as far as the effectiveness of macroeconomic 
policies is concerned. In addition to these two policy inputs, one could look at the out-of-sample 
forecasts for both the COI and the CII. In the paper, the out-of-sample forecasts have been 
employed in order to evaluate the EWMs. However, the methodology used allows predicting the 
COI two years ahead and the CII one year ahead of the last data update period. Given the large 
time requirements of data updates, we do not feel confident to put forward these predictions as 
another practical input into policy debates.    36  Jan Babecký, Tomáš Havránek, Jakub Matějů, 
   Marek Rusnák, Kateřina Šmídková, and Bořek Vašíček      
 
   
6.1 Sources of Risks 
In order to identify the major sources of risk, we look closely at the explanatory power of the 
useful leading indicators; to make the analysis easier to follow, we use the division of the 
indicators into groups introduced in Section 3. The groups are meant to represent distinct areas 
from which a risk or a signal of potential crisis could originate, such as the banking system, 
capital markets, and global variables. The contributions of individual groups of indicators to the 
prediction of the COI, as follows from the dynamic panel logit regression reported in Annex III, 
are summarized in Figure 13a.  




















Note: Shares in the model’s R-squared (0.21); based on regression with 8 lags reported in Annex II.   
 
The chart illustrates the main determinants of the COI eight quarters ahead, aggregated into the 
above-described groups; the associated percentages correspond to the groups’ shares in the 
model’s R-squared, which is equal to 0.21. Among the main sources of risk, global variables play 
a prominent role (16%), along with interest rates (16%), external indebtedness (12%), and 
developments in the real economy (12%). These four groups of variables together account for 
more than 56% of the model R-squared, which is equivalent to explaining around 12% of the total 
variation in the COI itself. 
We conduct a similar analysis for the CII, based on the results reported in Annex III. We assess 
the partial coefficients of determination and sum them for all the lags of each group. The results 
are depicted in Figure 13b.    Early Warning Indicators of Economic Crises: 


































Note: Shares in the model’s R-squared (0.45); based on fixed effects regression reported in Annex III. 
 
The percentages shown in Figure 13b correspond to the groups’ shares in the model R-squared, 
which is equal to 0.45. The most important groups of potential indicators are external debt (19%), 
housing prices (18%), the capital market situation (18%), and global variables (12%). Taken 
together, these groups comprise about 2/3 of the model’s R-squared, which means about 30% of 
the total variance in the CII. Oil prices are important as well, accounting for about 9% of the 
model’s R-squared. On the other hand, the fiscal stance and the banking system situation, among 
others, seem to be of little importance.  
A comparison of the determinants of crisis occurrence (Figure 13a) and crisis incidence (Figure 
13b) reveals one interesting finding: groups of indicators such as global variables, external debt, 
and housing prices are common important factors. On the other hand, some variables which 
account for a significant share of the variation of the COI make only a marginal contribution to 
the CII (e.g. interest rates) and vice versa (e.g. oil prices). The fact that the COI and the CII have 
different structures of their determinants is inherently related to the different aspects of a crisis 
captured by those two indicators: while the COI focuses on crisis occurrence, typically defined as 
large nominal volatility, the CII characterizes the real costs to the economy.  
In the next step, we conduct the same analysis for the two clusters of countries separately and 
present the results in Figure 14. While housing prices seem to be consistently important in both 
clusters and account for about 18% of the model’s R-squared, the importance of other groups 
differs greatly across clusters. External debt is highly important for the ‘core’ countries (Cluster 
2), accounting for 35% of the model’s R-squared, but is negligible for the countries included in 
Cluster 1. On the other hand, the capital market situation, global variables, oil prices, and money 
and credit indicators are much less important for the ‘core’ countries.  
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Last, we conduct a similar exercise using the results from our preferred EWM from Table 1, 
where the optimal leads were selected employing PVAR and the set of useful leading indicators 
was chosen by Bayesian model averaging. We use the baseline specification (fixed effects) and in 
Figure 15 report the results for each group of variables. The percentages in Figure 15 denote the 
groups’ shares in the model’s R-squared, which is equal to 0.37. In addition, in the right pie chart 
of Figure 15 we provide the percentages for the individual variables within the most important 
group, global variables. 
    Early Warning Indicators of Economic Crises: 




Figure 15: Most Important Early Warning Indicators 
 
Note: Shares in the model’s R-squared (0.37); based on fixed effects regression reported in Table 1. 
 
Compared to the previous results, several differences deserve attention. First, when our preferred 
EWM is used to examine the importance of potential leading indicators, variables reflecting the 
capital market situation are much less important (2% of the explanatory power, compared with 
18% in the previous case). The same finding applies to variables reflecting external debt (5%, 
compared with 19% in the previous case). On the other hand, global leading variables (such as 
world GDP, world inflation, and world credit) are much more important in our preferred EWM. 
The importance of oil prices remains similar (7%, compared with 9%). Finally, our results suggest 
that housing prices retain high explanatory power in all the models.  
It follows that regarding the sources of risk, it pays off for macroprudential policy to watch global 
variables and housing prices, since they represent economic segments that are important sources 
of risk. 
 
6.2 Possible Policy Reactions 
Following the discussion in Subsection 5.4, we employ our early warning index (EWI) and assess 
whether the available policy instruments are able to affect the predicted values of the CII for an 
‘average country’ in our panel. We also check whether the responses are similar for both the EWI 
and the CII; in other words, whether policy makers with the information provided by our EWM in 
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The panels of Figure 16 report the response function of the CII and the EWI (from bivariate 
PVAR consisting of the CII or the EWI and each policy variable) to a one-standard-deviation 
shock to selected policy variables. These policy variables cover monetary policy (central bank 
reserves, policy interest rate), fiscal policy (government consumption, tax burden), and financial 
supervision (banking sector capital ratio, banking sector liquidity ratio). These variables are meant 
to represent the policy tools that the national authorities have used during past decades to keep 
their economies stable.  
Three important caveats must be kept in mind. First, data limitations are a serious problem in 
many policy areas. For example, data on various financial sector bail-outs are not incorporated 
into fiscal budget data consistently across countries. Second, given the size of the country sample 
as well as the time span we cannot include all the variables we would like to. It can be argued that 
each macroeconomic policy area can be represented by numerous policy variables when it comes 
to crisis prevention. Tax incentives affecting the housing market are a good example of such 
measures. For the sake of simplicity and due to data limitations, we select a few variables only to 
represent each policy, mostly according to data availability. Third, we lack variables to represent 
macroprudential policy, for example the extent of leverage among institutions and investors, and 
supervisory and regulatory instruments (see Table 2 in Frait and Komárková, 2011, for a 
comparison of monetary versus macroprudential indicators and instruments). The last caveat is the 
least serious. It can be argued that these tools were not consistently used in the past and so, given 
our data sample, omitting them is not a problem. However, for future research, missing data on 
macroprudential policy tools may seriously affect this type of analysis. 
The illustrative results can be summarized as follows. First, the response functions are consistent 
for the EWI and the CII, corroborating the previous checks (measures of fit and forecasting 
performance), which indicated that the EWI predicts the CII reasonably well. Second, there is 
substantial heterogeneity in the efficiency of different policy tools.  
The actions of central banks seem to be the most efficient in altering the risk of crises. In 
particular, an increase in central bank reserves and an increase in the policy rate reduce crisis 
incidence in one year. While the downward effect of a rising policy rate on crisis incidence seems 
rather counterintuitive should it occur over the longer term, in the short run an increase in the 
policy rate may serve as a stabilizing tool, helping to anchor market expectations. 
The evidence on the efficiency of other policies is mixed. Government consumption does not 
seem to have any effect on crisis incidence.
7 Also, variables related to financial supervision do not 
affect the CII or EWI substantially. This finding should be interpreted with caution, however. 
There are a lot of serious data limitations in this area that prevent us from representing 
supervisory policies adequately and on a sufficient data sample.  
Figure 17 reports the same response functions when the data of only one country, the Czech 
Republic, are considered. The general impression is that the patterns found in the panel setting for 
the ‘average country’ hold also for the Czech Republic. Monetary policy seems to be efficient in 
                                                           
7 Since the three variables which enter the CII are expressed in deviations from the HP trend and are then 
combined, we believe that endogeneity between the CII and fiscal policy is not an issue. In fact, the correlation 
between the CII and fiscal policy variables is quite small.     Early Warning Indicators of Economic Crises: 




smoothing crises: both increasing reserves and an increasing policy rate reduce the incidence of 
crisis. However, there are some important differences. First, due to a substantially smaller sample 
size the confidence intervals are rather wide and the estimates imprecise, especially in the longer 
term (4–12 quarters). This illustrates the usefulness of the panel approach. Second, an increase of 
the banking capital ratio seems to reduce crisis incidence (traced by both the CII and the EWI) in 
the Czech case. 
In addition, we consider the possibility of international policy spillover. Given that the previous 
results pointed to the importance of monetary policy, we test whether the Fed’s actions induce 
actions in other central banks as well as directly affecting crisis incidence in other countries. We 
run a trivariate VAR with the US policy rate (a global policy variable, which is common to all 
countries), the national policy rate, and the CII/EWI, and report the response functions of the 
national policy rate and the CII/EWI to a one-standard-deviation shock to the US policy rate. The 
results, reported in Figure 18, confirm that an increase of the US policy rate not only induces an 
increase in national policy rates (with a peak at 6 to 9 quarters), but also directly reduces both the 
CII and the EWI (with a peak at 4 to 8 quarters). Though this should be considered as only 
preliminary evidence on global policy spillovers, it seems that US monetary policy can alter crisis 
incidence abroad. 
Finally, it should also be noted that shocks to the EWI and the CII also produce some policy 
variable responses, suggesting that policy actions might also come as a result of crisis 
materialization (these figures are not reported here but are available in the online appendix). For 
robustness checks, we (i) tested an alternative ordering with policy instruments coming after the 
EWI/CII, (ii) ran the PVAR including different combinations of policy instruments at the same 
time, and (iii) tested the consistency of the results for the two clusters of countries. The 
benchmark results, reported in Figures 16, 17, and 18, were confirmed in all cases.   42  Jan Babecký, Tomáš Havránek, Jakub Matějů, 
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Figure 16: Response of CII/EWI to Policy Instruments (RESERVES, POLRATE, 
GOVTCONS, TAXBURDEN, BANKCAPRATIO, BANKLIQRATIO) in Bivariate 
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Figure 16: (cont.) Response of CII/EWI to Policy Instruments (RESERVES, POLRATE, 
GOVTCONS, TAXBURDEN, BANKCAPRATIO, BANKLIQRATIO) in Bivariate 
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Figure 17: Response of CII/EWI to Policy Instruments for Czech Republic (RESERVES, 
POLRATE, GOVTCONS, TAXBURDEN, BANKCAPRATIO, BANKLIQRATIO) in 
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Figure 17: (cont.) Response of CII/EWI to Policy Instruments for Czech Republic 
(RESERVES, POLRATE, GOVTCONS, TAXBURDEN, BANKCAPRATIO, 
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Figure 18: Effect of Global Policy Instruments: Response of POLRATE and CII/EWI to 
USPOLRATE in Trivariate 4-Lag Panel VAR 
 
POLRATE, USPOLRATE (VAR with CII) 
 









EWI, USPOLRATE (VAR with CII) 
 
 
6.3 Predicting the Crisis Occurrence Index and the Crisis Incidence Index 
The out-of-sample predictions of both indexes can potentially yield interesting information for 
policy makers. In the case of the COI, the time horizon is fixed to two years (three years 
alternatively) due to the construction of the COI. It follows that for our data sample, which does 
not go further than 2010, we can predict the COI for the 2012 horizon. The time horizon is shorter 
for the CII since the CII utilizes the optimal time lags. According to our definition of the early 
warning indicator, the minimum time lag considered is four quarters. Therefore, the CII cannot be 
predicted for more than one year ahead. (Moreover, for some individual variables comprising the 
EWI we have data only till 2009q4, so we can only predict up to 2010q4.) This trade-off between 
searching for the best possible combination of early warning indicators (as represented by the 
COI) and the ability to predict crisis incidence with a sufficient lead (as done by the CII) 
illustrates well why it is useful to work with an EWS consisting of several EWMs.     Early Warning Indicators of Economic Crises: 




Figure 19 shows the predicted COI values for the UK and Czech Republic, our two benchmark 
countries. 2010 comes out as a period of relatively low probability of crisis, while from the 
beginning of 2011 the probability of crisis starts to rise in both the United Kingdom and the Czech 
Republic, falling first toward late 2012. This might be caused by the worsening global outlook, 
while the effects of the need for fiscal restriction may play a role as well. Some similarity in the 
predicted crisis occurrence between the UK and the Czech Republic suggests the presence of 
common (global) factors. Next, the three-year-ahead predictions show a higher probability of 
crisis compared to the two-year-ahead case. Predictions with a longer horizon use a longer history 
(three years versus two years of data) to infer about the future and thus they are potentially more 
informative, at the same time being more volatile due to an increase in uncertainty along with a 
longer forecast horizon.  
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Note: Out-of-sample predicted values of crisis occurrence, 2010q1–2012q3. The forecast horizon for 8Q-
ahead crisis occurrence in the Czech Republic case ends in 2011 due to data availability.  
 
 
Figure 20 illustrates the more limited predictive capacity of the CII for the same two countries, the 
prediction horizon being limited to 2010q4. Following an upward trend as from the end of 2009 
through a moderation during 2010, the crisis incidence shows a decline by the end of 2010 for 
both the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic, largely reflecting improving global factors in 
the aftermath of the 2008/2009 crisis.   48  Jan Babecký, Tomáš Havránek, Jakub Matějů, 
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Note: Out-of-sample predicted values of crisis incidence, 2009q4–2010q4. 
 
7. Conclusions 
In this study we create an early warning system represented by two complementary models: a 
discrete model exploring crisis occurrence and a continuous model dealing with crisis incidence, 
which characterizes the real costs of a crisis for the economy. As the basis for our analysis, we 
collect a unique CDEC 40-40 data set of crisis occurrence and compute crisis incidence for a 
sample of 40 developed countries, including the EU-27 group, over 1970–2010 at quarterly 
frequency, thus filling a gap in the early warning literature, which has so far mainly focused on 
either panel data sets comprising developing economies or large cross-sections. We explicitly 
differentiate between policy variables and leading indicators; leading indicators, in turn, are 
divided into country-specific variables and global factors.  
Using a set of 50 potential leading indicators we identify the determinants of crisis occurrence and 
crisis incidence employing our discrete and continuous models. We then assess the models’ 
performance in terms of in-sample and out-of-sample fit. In addition, the discrete model is 
complemented with an indicator of usefulness, illustrating the trade-off between the noise-to-
signal ratio and the loss function. The continuous model in turn allows us to simulate the past 
effectiveness of selected policy measures in mitigating crisis incidence for the economy.  
In constructing our continuous model, we relax the typical assumption of a fixed horizon at which 
the early warning signals come. We test for the optimal lag length employing a panel VAR 
framework and examine the impulse responses of crisis incidence and its potential leading 
indicators. Next, we apply Bayesian model averaging in order to identify useful leading indicators 
out of the 50 potential indicators we collected. We then use panel estimation techniques 
(including dynamic estimations and system GMM) to assess the determinants of crisis incidence. 
Finally, we check for sample homogeneity by employing the random coefficient model and 
clustering.     Early Warning Indicators of Economic Crises: 




Our key results can be summarized as follows. First, we find that crisis incidence warning signals 
come at various horizons. We classify those horizons into early warning (one to three years), late 
warning (less than one year), and ultra early warning (more than three years). We argue that it is 
important to account for the time lags of potential leading indicators when building an (early) 
warning model. The way economic indicators develop prior to the crisis depends on the horizon 
chosen. For example, we find that a strengthening of the domestic currency increases crisis 
incidence in four years (hence currency appreciation could issue an ‘ultra early warning’ signal), 
while the domestic currency depreciates just several quarters prior to an observed increase in 
crisis incidence (a ‘too late warning’). Thus, timely policy reactions could mitigate crisis 
incidence.  
Next, we find that historical decomposition provides useful information on the sources of crisis 
incidence, in particular national versus global factors. Regarding national factors, we find that 
housing prices are an important source of risks to macroeconomic stability. Global variables are 
another influential risk factor. In the presence of global risks, national policies are unlikely to be 
an efficient tool to cope with crises. In what follows, more attention should be paid to 
international policy coordination.  
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ANNEX I: Data 
I.1 List of Countries 
 
 No.  Country  EU  OECD 
1  Australia    OECD 
2  Austria  EU  OECD 
3  Belgium  EU  OECD 
4  Bulgaria  EU   
5  Canada    OECD 
6  Cyprus  EU   
7  Czech Republic  EU  OECD 
8  Denmark  EU  OECD 
9  Estonia  EU  OECD 
10  Finland  EU  OECD 
11  France  EU  OECD 
12  Germany  EU  OECD 
13  Greece  EU  OECD 
14  Hungary  EU  OECD 
15  Chile    OECD 
16  Iceland    OECD 
17  Ireland  EU  OECD 
18  Israel    OECD 
19  Italy  EU  OECD 
20  Japan    OECD 
21  Korea    OECD 
22  Latvia  EU   
23  Lithuania  EU   
24  Luxembourg  EU  OECD 
25  Malta  EU   
26  Mexico    OECD 
27  Netherlands  EU  OECD 
28  New Zealand    OECD 
29  Norway    OECD 
30  Poland  EU  OECD 
31  Portugal  EU  OECD 
32  Romania  EU   
33  Slovakia  EU  OECD 
34  Slovenia  EU  OECD 
35  Spain  EU  OECD 
36  Sweden  EU  OECD 
37  Switzerland    OECD 
38  Turkey    OECD 
39  United Kingdom  EU  OECD 
40  United States    OECD 
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I.2 Groups of Variables 
 
No. Groups 
CII  Crises Incidence Index 
G0 Policy  tools 
G1 Monetary  policy  stance 
G2 Interest  rates 
G3  Banking system situation 
G4 Capital  market  situation 
G5  Money and credit 
G6  Debts and savings 
G7 External  debt 
G8 Housing  prices 
G9 Real  economy 
G10 Fiscal  stance 
G11 External  balance 
G12 Global  variables 
 
I.3 Variables, Transformations, and Data Sources 
 
 No.  Group 
Sign in 
the group 
average:   






level (l)   Code Variable  Source 
1  CII  0  g   rgdp  GDP, real, seasonally adjusted, HP-filtered gap  IMF IFS  
2  CII 0  l  govtbalance  Government  balance,  per cent of GDP, HP-filtered gap  NIGEM 
3  CII 1  l  unemployment 
Unemployment rate (% of labor force), seasonally adjusted, 
HP-filtered gap  IMF IFS  
4  G0     l  m2toreserves  M2/foreign exchange reserves (%)  WDI 
5  G0     g  cbreserves  Central bank reserves  IMF IFS  
6  G0     g  reserves  Reserves  IMF IFS  
7  G0     g  resimports  Reserves (in months of imports)  WDI 
8  G0     l  polrate  Policy interest rate   IMF IFS  
9  G1  0  g  neer  Nominal effective exchange rate  IMF IFS  
10  G1 1  g  m1  M1  IMF  IFS   
11  G1  0  l  mmrate  Money market interest rate  IMF IFS  
12  G2  0  l  lenrate  Interest rate on credit  IMF IFS  
13  G2  0  l  deprate  Deposit interest rate  IMF IFS  
14  G2  0  l  govtbond  Long-term bond yield, nominal  IMF IFS  
15  G3  0  l  termspread  Spread (long-term bond yield minus short-term interest rate)  IMF IFS  
16  G3 0  l  debtcreditspread  Deposit-credit spread   IMF IFS  
17  G3  0  l  bankcapratio  Banking sector capital ratio  WDI 
18  G3  0  l  bankliqratio  Bank liquid reserves to bank assets ratio (%)  WDI 
19  G3  1  l  nonperfloans  Bank non-performing loans (% of loans, 2006)  WDI 
20  G4 1  l  mktcap  Stock  market  capitalization  NIGEM 
21  G4  1  g  shareprice  Stock market index  IMF IFS  
22  G4  1  l  equityreturns  Equity market returns  IMF IFS  
23  G5 1  g  m2  M2  IMF  IFS   
24  G5 1  g  m3  M3  IMF  IFS   
25  G5  1  l  domprivcredit  Domestic private sector credit (% of GDP, 2006)  WDI   56  Jan Babecký, Tomáš Havránek, Jakub Matějů, 
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26  G6  1  l  govtdebt  Government debt (% of GDP)  NIGEM 
27  G6  1  g  hhdebt  Gross liabilities of personal sector  NIGEM 
28  G6  0  l  netsavings  Net national savings (% of GNI)  WDI 
29  G6  0  l  grosssavings  Gross national savings (% of GDP)  WDI 
30  G7  1  g  foreignliab  Gross foreign liabilities  NIGEM 
31  G7  0  l  nfa  Net external position (% of GDP, 2004)  IMF 
32  G7 1  l  foreigndebt  Foreign  debt/GDP  (%)  WDI 
33  G8 1  l  residcapform  Private  residential fixed capital formation  OECD 
34  G8  1  g  houseprices  House price index 
a 
35  G8 1  g  aggassetprices  Nominal aggregate asset price index 
a 
36  G9  1 l  indprodch  Percentage change in industrial production  IMF IFS  
37  G9  1  g  hhcons  Private final consumption expenditure  IMF IFS  
38  G9  1  g  capform  Gross total fixed capital formation  IMF IFS  
39  G9 1  l  indshare  Industry  share  WDI 
40  G9 1  l  servshare Services  share  WDI 
41  G9  1  l  trade  Trade (% of GDP)  WDI 
42  G10  1  g  govtcons  Government consumption  IMF IFS  
43  G10  0  l  taxburden  Total tax burden  OECD 
44  G11  0  g  curaccount_ifs  Current account  IMF IFS  
45  G11  0  g  trbalance  Trade balance  IMF IFS  
46  G11  0  g  reer  Real effective exchange rate index  IMF IFS  
47  G11  1  l  fdiinflow  FDI net inflows (% of GDP)  WDI 
48  G11 1  l  fdioutflow FDI  net outflows (% of GDP)  WDI 
49  G12  1  l  termsoftrade  Terms of trade  IMF IFS  
50  G12 1  g  wrgdp  Global GDP
b  NIGEM 
51  G12 1  g  wtrade  Global  trade  NIGEM 
52  G12  1  l  winf  Global inflation  IMF IFS  
53  G12  1  l  wbankcredit  Global credit (% of GDP)  IMF IFS  
54  G12  1  l  wcreditpriv  Global domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)  WDI 
55  G12  1  l  wfdiinflow  Global FDI inflow (% of GDP)  UNCTAD 
56  G12  1  g  wexpprice  Global export prices  IMF IFS  
57  v1  1  l  inflation  Consumer price inflation (%)   IMF IFS  
58  v2 0  g  comprice 
Commodity prices (we take crude oil petroleum, high 
correlation)  IMF IFS  
Note: 
a Global Property Guide (www.globalpropertyguide.com) and BIS calculations based on national 
data. 
b Although country-specific GDP enters the composition of the CII, the use of global GDP among 
the explanatory variables should not cause significant endogeneity bias since each country’s weight 
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Lagged COI  1.626
*** (7.74) 0.797
*** (3.42) 
Nominal effective exchange rate  0.261
* (2.17) 0.0263  (0.23) 
M1 0.129  (1.14)  0.400
** (3.09) 
Money market interest rate  0.243  (0.93)  -0.543  (-1.56) 
Interest rate on credit  -1.353
*** (-4.02) -1.551
*** (-4.68) 
Deposit interest rate  0.901
** (3.12)  0.642
* (2.28) 
Long-term bond yield, nominal  1.042
*** (5.09) 1.864
*** (6.21) 
Term spread  -0.254  (-1.84)  -0.529
** (-2.97) 
Deposit-credit spread  0.558
*** (4.18) 0.652
*** (5.02) 
Banking sector capital ratio  -0.117  (-1.05)  -0.426
** (-3.05) 
st_creditinfoindex -0.198  (-0.79)  -0.213  (-0.39) 
Bank liquid reserves  -0.169  (-1.42)  -0.300
* (-2.27) 
Bank non-performing loans  -0.565
*** (-3.80) -0.907
*** (-4.59) 
Stock market capitalization  0.284  (1.22)  1.027
*** (3.42) 
Stock market index  -0.00729  (-0.04)  0.0251  (0.12) 
Equity market returns  -0.445
* (-2.36)  -0.369 (-1.92) 
M2 0.135  (1.08)  0.116  (0.83) 
M3 -0.0117  (-0.10)  0.0220  (0.17) 
Domestic private sector credit   0.766
*** (6.25) 0.833
*** (6.39) 
st_domcredit -0.250  (-1.51)  -0.699
*** (-3.36) 
Government debt (% of GDP)  0.0642  (0.44)  -0.0686  (-0.47) 
Gross liabilities of private sector  0.235
* (1.97)  0.593
*** (4.73) 
Gross national savings  0.608
*** (4.07) 0.807
*** (5.16) 
Gross foreign liabilities  0.610
*** (4.93) -0.758
*** (-5.22) 
Net external position  -0.605
*** (-4.96) -0.577
*** (-4.16) 
Foreign debt/GDP  -0.337  (-1.54)  -0.00431  (-0.01) 
Private residential fixed capital formation  1.433
*** (7.52)  0.191  (0.94) 
House price index  -0.0907  (-0.78)  -0.149  (-1.14) 
Nominal aggregate asset price index  0.286  (1.82)  0.508
** (2.74) 
Percentage change in industrial prod.  -0.0283  (-0.28)  0.0333  (0.32) 
Private final consumption expenditure  -0.0500  (-0.46)  0.0492  (0.40) 
Gross total fixed capital formation  0.0405  (0.37)  -0.100  (-0.78) 
Industry share  0.501  (0.95)  0.348  (0.64) 




Government consumption  -0.00288  (-0.03)  -0.0585  (-0.50) 
Total tax burden  0.824
*** (5.97) 0.660
*** (4.11) 
Current account  -0.0309  (-0.31)  -0.0970  (-0.87) 
Trade balance  0.00648  (0.06)  -0.0758  (-0.63) 
Real effective exchange rate index  -0.107  (-0.93)  0.0806  (0.70) 
FDI inflows  -0.538
*** (-4.07)  -0.188  (-1.35) 
FDI outflows  0.256  (1.83)  0.902
*** (5.20) 
Terms of trade  -0.120  (-1.08)  0.274
* (2.31) 
Global GDP  0.108  (0.79)  0.0457  (0.33) 
Global trade  0.170  (0.87)  -0.0943  (-0.38) 
Global inflation  0.0218  (0.18)  0.375
** (3.11) 
Global credit  1.783  (1.90)  2.164
* (2.35) 
Global domestic credit to private sector  -1.483  (-1.58)  -2.951
** (-3.16) 
Global FDI, inflow  -0.656
** (-2.73) -2.804
*** (-7.86) 
Global export prices  -0.198  (-1.82)  -0.250
* (-2.22)   58  Jan Babecký, Tomáš Havránek, Jakub Matějů, 
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Consumer price inflation  0.112  (0.94)  0.0455  (0.37) 
Oil prices  -0.0865  (-0.65)  0.304  (1.85) 
s1 -0.00723  (-0.03)  0.442  (1.48) 
s2 0.0732  (0.31)  0.0929  (0.38) 
s3 0.157  (0.55)  0.247  (0.82) 
Observations 2611    2460   
Note: t statistics in parentheses; 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001. Dependent variable: binary, crisis 
incidence according to the literature; explanatory variables lagged by 8 and 12 quarters, respectively.    Early Warning Indicators of Economic Crises: 




ANNEX III: Early Warning Indicators for Crisis Incidence  
(groups, all lags)  
  Fixed Effects    System GMM   
L4.Crisis Incidence Index  0.318
*** (15.69) 0.389
*** (9.88) 
L8.Crisis Incidence Index  -0.231
*** (-9.66) -0.208
*** (-5.91) 
L12.Crisis Incidence Index  -0.107
*** (-4.22) -0.0705
* (-2.02) 
L16.Crisis Incidence Index  -0.147
*** (-6.53) -0.0907
** (-2.88) 
L4.Monetary policy stance  -0.122
**  (-2.84) -0.106 (-1.67) 
L8.Monetary policy stance  0.00199  (0.04)  0.0253  (0.47) 
L12.Monetary policy stance  0.0103  (0.21)  -0.00895  (-0.15) 
L16.Monetary policy stance  0.132
** (2.81) 0.0980 (1.83) 
L4.Interest rates  0.00355  (0.06)  -0.0546  (-0.52) 
L8.Interest  rates  0.0634 (0.80) 0.0568 (0.65) 
L12.Interest  rates  0.118 (1.49) 0.126 (1.15) 
L16.Interest  rates  0.0649 (1.02) 0.0109 (0.17) 
L4.Banking system situation  0.0839  (1.66)  0.156
* (2.21) 
L8.Banking system situation  -0.243
*** (-3.61) -0.271
** (-3.16) 
L12.Banking  system  situation 0.115 (1.63) 0.107 (1.27) 
L16.Banking  system  situation 0.0810 (1.33) 0.0973 (1.02) 
L4.Capital market situation  -0.221
*** (-7.41) -0.255
*** (-5.56) 
L8.Capital market situation  -0.00321  (-0.10)  -0.0274  (-0.70) 
L12.Capital market situation  -0.200
*** (-6.03) -0.221
*** (-5.83) 
L16.Capital market situation  -0.00291  (-0.09)  -0.000973  (-0.03) 
L4.Money and credit  -0.137
*** (-4.05) -0.184
*** (-3.87) 
L8.Money  and  credit  0.0377 (0.94) 0.0307 (0.67) 
L12.Money and credit  0.0421  (0.97)  0.0624  (1.10) 
L16.Money and credit  0.153
** (3.28) 0.131
* (2.33) 
L4.Debts and savings  -0.157
* (-2.51) -0.167
* (-2.02) 
L8.Debts  and  savings  0.158 (1.78) 0.154 (1.30) 
L12.Debts  and  savings  -0.167 (-1.86) -0.106 (-0.80) 
L16.Debts and savings  0.0765  (1.17)  0.00920  (0.13) 
L4.External debt  -0.349
*** (-7.33) -0.352
*** (-3.31) 
L8.External debt  0.344
*** (6.38) 0.387
** (2.92) 
L12.External  debt  0.0824 (1.21) 0.0833 (0.60) 
L16.External debt  0.0335  (0.44)  0.00996  (0.05) 
L4.Housing prices  -0.346
*** (-9.23) -0.335
*** (-4.62) 
L8.Housing prices  0.00245  (0.06)  0.0693  (1.07) 
L12.Housing prices  -0.0391  (-0.78)  0.0298  (0.32) 
L16.Housing prices  -0.0258  (-0.53)  0.0206  (0.31) 
L4.Real  economy  -0.0410  (-0.64) -0.114 (-1.12) 
L8.Real  economy  -0.0106 (-0.13) -0.0435 (-0.51) 
L12.Real economy  0.212
* (2.44) 0.177 (1.78) 
L16.Real  economy  0.139 (1.83) 0.140 (1.37) 
L4.Fiscal stance  -0.0851  (-1.89)  -0.104
* (-2.04) 
L8.Fiscal stance  -0.0171  (-0.32)  -0.00197  (-0.03) 
L12.Fiscal  stance  0.0112 (0.20) 0.0247 (0.35) 
L16.Fiscal stance  0.105
* (2.00) 0.0912 (1.46) 
L4.External balance  -0.0108  (-0.39)  -0.00633  (-0.13) 
L8.External  balance  -0.0370 (-1.13) -0.0274 (-0.69) 
L12.External  balance  0.0718 (1.92) 0.0705 (1.57) 













L4.Inflation  -0.0886 (-1.25) -0.0830 (-0.97) 
L8.Inflation 0.115  (1.56)  0.156
* (2.09) 
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L16.Inflation  -0.0831 (-1.22) -0.0689 (-0.98) 
L4.Oil prices  0.109
** (3.14) 0.130
*** (3.63) 
L8.Oil  prices  0.0703 (1.92) 0.0704 (1.61) 
L12.Oil prices  -0.283
*** (-3.85) -0.294
*** (-4.24) 




*** (4.82)     
s2 0.238
* (2.14)     
s3 0.139  (1.25)     
Constant -0.367
***  (-4.40) -0.0680 (-0.59) 
Observations  2916  2916  
Countries  37  37  
R-squared  0.447     
Note: t statistics in parentheses, 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
Response variable: hp_cii. Groups are constructed as the first principal component of the underlying  
indicators. 
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ANNEX IV:  Bayesian Model Averaging 
IV.1 Methodology 
Consider the following linear regression model:  
ε β α γ γ γ + + = X y    ε ~  ) , 0 (
2I σ , 
where  y  is the dependent variable (the crisis incidence index in our case),  γ α  is a constant,  γ β   
is a vector of coefficients, and ε  is a white noise error term.  γ X  denotes some subset of all 
available relevant explanatory variables X .  K  potential explanatory variables yield 
K 2  potential 
models. Subscript γ  is used to refer to one specific model out of these 
K 2 models.  
The information from the models is then averaged using the posterior model probabilities that are 
implied by Bayes’ theorem: 
) ( ) , | ( ) , | ( γ γ γ M p X M y p X y M p ∝ , 
where  ) , | ( X y M p γ  is the posterior model probability, which is proportional to the marginal 
likelihood of the model  ) , | ( X M y p γ  times the prior probability of the model  ) ( γ M p . 
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We elicit the priors on the parameters and models as follows. Since  γ α  and 
2 σ are common to all  
models we can use uniform priors (
2
2 1
) ( , 1 ) (
σ
σ αγ ∝ = p p ) to reflect a lack of knowledge. As  
for the parameters γ β , we follow the literature and use Zellner’s g  prior  g M ,
2, | γ γ σ β ~ 
). ) ( , 0 (
1 2 − ′ γ γ σ X X g N  Following Fernandez et al. (2001a), the prior for g  is set as 
) , max(
2 K N g = . When choosing priors for the model space, we follow the advice of Ley and 
Steel (2009), who suggest using the Binomial-Beta prior. Let m  denote the model size, then  
m ~ ), , ( ξ K Bin   )
E(m)
E(m) - K
  Beta(1,   ~ ξ , where K  is the number of regressors considered and ξ   
is the prior probability of including each variable. In order to get a completely flat model prior, we 
specify . 2 / ) ( K m E =   
The robustness of the variable in explaining the dependent variables can be captured by the 
probability that a given variable is included in the regression. We refer to it as the posterior 
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Finally, since it is usually not possible to go through all of the models if the number of potential 
explanatory variables is large (in our case with 50 variables, the model space is almost 10
15), we 
employ the Markov Chain Monte Carlo Model Comparison (MC
3) method developed by Madigan 
and York (1995). The MC
3 method focuses on model regions with high posterior model 
probability and is thus able to approximate the exact posterior probability in a more efficient 
manner. The technical details of the BMA procedure can be found in Feldkircher and Zeugner 
(2009). 
To obtain the posterior distributions of the parameters of interest for our sample of 50 explanatory 
variables in a quarterly panel of 40 countries over 1970–2010, we use 2,000,000 draws from the 
MC
3 sampler after discarding the first 1,000,000 burn-in draws. All computations are performed 
in the R-package BMS (Feldkircher and Zeugner, 2009). To account for any unobserved 
(constant) country heterogeneity, we perform fixed effects estimation. 
Finally, to assess the quality of the BMA results, we perform the following frequentist check. As 
the baseline case, we select all variables with an inclusion probability that exceeds 50% based on 
the BMA exercise and run a regression model with fixed effects for the individual countries: 
CIIit = αi + βCIIit-4 + γXijt + δSkt + uit, 
where CII denotes the crisis incidence index, CIIit-4 denotes the value of the index observed four 
quarters ago, αi denotes country dummies, Sk denotes seasonal dummies, uit denotes normally 
distributed disturbances, i and t denote country and quarter subscripts, and Xj are potential 
warning indicators selected by BMA with lag length based on the panel VAR model discussed in 
Section 5.1. This specification can be thought of as a frequentist check of the BMA exercise: since 
we only select variables with an inclusion probability higher than 50%, all slope coefficients in 
the regression should be statistically significant. We also expect the signs of the estimated 
coefficients to be consistent with the posterior means reported by the BMA. The fixed-effects 
estimator is the obvious default choice for the panel data set at our disposal since the estimator 
takes into account unobserved individual country effects that do not change in time.    Early Warning Indicators of Economic Crises: 





Table A1: Dynamic BMA with Exact Lags (Lags Set upon PVAR) 
   PIP  Post Mean  Post SD   Pos. Sign 
Crisis Incidence Index      
hp_cii_L4  1.000 0.315 0.017 1.000 
Monetary policy stance      
st_neer_L12 0.927  0.184 0.065 1.000 
st_m1_L12  0.009 0.000 0.006 0.994 
st_mmrate_L13  0.989 0.224 0.057 1.000 
Interest rates             
st_lenrate_L13  0.023 0.003 0.025 1.000 
st_deprate_L14  0.010 0.001 0.009 1.000 
st_govtbond_L15 0.065  -0.008  0.034  0.000 
Banking system situation             
st_termspread_L7 0.951  -0.142 0.051  0.000 
st_debtcreditspread_L13 0.145  -0.015  0.039  0.000 
st_bankcapratio_L13 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.173 
st_bankliqratio_L13 0.017 0.001 0.009 1.000 
st_nonperfloans_L8  0.006 0.000 0.003 0.000 
Capital market situation             
st_mktcap_L5 0.078  -0.010  0.040  0.000 
st_shareprice_L5 0.154  -0.023  0.059  0.000 
st_equityreturns_L4 1.000  -0.354 0.052  0.000 
Money and credit             
st_m2_L8  0.344 0.044 0.066 1.000 
st_m3_L4 0.880  -0.133  0.065  0.000 
st_domprivcredit_L9  0.967 0.137 0.045 1.000 
Debts and savings             
st_govtdebt_L4 0.569  -0.093  0.091  0.000 
st_hhdebt_L11  0.010 0.001 0.007 1.000 
st_netsavings_L5  0.013 0.001 0.012 0.938 
st_grosssavings_L4 0.942 -0.171  0.064 0.000 
External debt             
st_foreignliab_L5 1.000  -0.215  0.040  0.000 
st_nfa_L8 0.161  -0.015  0.038  0.000 
st_foreigndebt_L4  0.005 0.000 0.003 0.993 
Housing prices             
st_residcapform_L5 1.000  -0.253 0.043  0.000 
st_houseprices_L5 1.000  -0.377  0.045  0.000 
st_aggassetprices_L5 0.935  -0.209  0.076  0.000 
Real economy             
st_indprodch_L4 0.016  -0.001  0.008  0.000 
st_hhcons_L4 0.012  -0.001  0.007  0.000 
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st_indshare_L15  0.006 0.000 0.005 0.363 
st_servshare_L15  0.006 0.000 0.006 0.651 
st_trade_L10  0.996 0.245 0.061 1.000 
Fiscal stance             
st_govtcons_L4  0.172 0.015 0.037 1.000 
st_taxburden_L6  0.005 0.000 0.002 0.975 
External balance             
st_curaccount_ifs_L4  0.117 0.011 0.033 1.000 
st_trbalance_L4  0.811 0.098 0.057 1.000 
st_reer_L12  0.085 0.014 0.049 1.000 
st_fdiinflow_L5 0.011  -0.001  0.007  0.000 
st_fdioutflow_L6 0.157  -0.016  0.041  0.000 
Global variables             
st_termsoftrade_L12 0.998 0.209 0.050 1.000 
st_wrgdp_L4 1.000  -0.653  0.081  0.000 
st_wtrade_L4  0.599 0.102 0.094 1.000 
st_winf_L14  1.000 0.270 0.057 1.000 
st_wcreditpriv_L8 1.000  -0.433 0.067  0.000 
st_wfdiinflow_L6  0.998 0.251 0.060 1.000 
st_wexpprice_L4  1.000 0.191 0.042 1.000 
Inflation             
st_inflation_L16  0.006 0.000 0.004 0.279 
Commodity prices             
st_comprice_L10 1.000  -0.388  0.065  0.000 
Note: Coefficients in bold type have posterior inclusion probability higher than 0.5 
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Table A2: Dynamic BMA with Variables Lagged by 3 Years 
   PIP  Post Mean  Post SD  Pos. Sign 
Crisis Incidence Index        
hp_cii_L4 1.000  0.209  0.017  1.000 
Monetary policy stance        
st_neer_L12 0.023  0.002  0.014  1.000 
st_m1_L12 0.005  0.000  0.003  0.070 
st_mmrate_L12 0.995  0.326  0.085  1.000 
Interest rates             
st_lenrate_L12 0.892  0.250  0.112  1.000 
st_deprate_L12 0.022  0.003  0.027  0.984 
st_govtbond_L12 0.008  0.000  0.009  1.000 
Banking system situation             
st_termspread_L12 0.007  0.000  0.007  0.047 
st_debtcreditspread_L12 0.011  -0.001  0.008  0.017 
st_bankcapratio_L12 0.055  0.003  0.015  1.000 
st_bankliqratio_L12 0.007  0.000  0.005  1.000 
st_nonperfloans_L12 1.000  -0.246  0.042  0.000 
Capital market situation             
st_mktcap_L12 0.163  0.030  0.073  1.000 
st_shareprice_L12 0.959  -0.234  0.069  0.000 
st_equityreturns_L12 0.052  -0.011  0.052  0.000 
Money and credit             
st_m2_L12 0.013  0.001  0.009  1.000 
st_m3_L12 0.044  0.004  0.023  1.000 
st_domprivcredit_L12 0.006  0.000  0.004  0.957 
Debts and savings             
st_govtdebt_L12 1.000  -0.304  0.053  0.000 
st_hhdebt_L12 0.005  0.000  0.004  0.000 
st_netsavings_L12 0.014  0.003  0.028  0.942 
st_grosssavings_L12 0.021  -0.003  0.031  0.000 
External debt             
st_foreignliab_L12 1.000  0.666  0.056  1.000 
st_nfa_L12 0.027  -0.002  0.013  0.000 
st_foreigndebt_L12 0.011  0.001  0.008  1.000 
Housing prices             
st_residcapform_L12 0.008  0.000  0.006  0.011 
st_houseprices_L12 0.007  0.000  0.005  1.000 
st_aggassetprices_L12 0.005  0.000  0.006  0.123 
Real economy             
st_indprodch_L12 0.005  0.000  0.003  0.000 
st_hhcons_L12 0.005  0.000  0.003  0.249 
st_capform_L12 0.005  0.000  0.003  1.000 
st_indshare_L12 0.005  0.000  0.004  0.612 
st_servshare_L12 0.008  -0.001  0.009  0.000 
st_trade_L12 0.006  0.000  0.005  0.064 
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st_govtcons_L12 0.005  0.000  0.003  0.961 
st_taxburden_L12 0.624  0.064  0.055  1.000 
External balance             
st_curaccount_ifs_L12 0.006  0.000  0.004  1.000 
st_trbalance_L12 0.006  0.000  0.004  1.000 
st_reer_L12 0.033  0.003  0.017  1.000 
st_fdiinflow_L12 0.454  0.064  0.076  1.000 
st_fdioutflow_L12 0.013  0.001  0.010  0.989 
Global variables             
st_termsoftrade_L12 0.106  0.012  0.039  1.000 
st_wrgdp_L12 0.011  0.001  0.009  1.000 
st_wtrade_L12 0.006  0.000  0.007  0.000 
st_winf_L12 1.000  0.584  0.059  1.000 
st_wcreditpriv_L12 1.000 0.595  0.070 1.000 
st_wfdiinflow_L12 1.000  1.440  0.081  1.000 
st_wexpprice_L12 0.284  0.048  0.082  1.000 
Inflation             
st_inflation_L12 0.033  0.003  0.021  1.000 
Commodity prices             
st_comprice_L12 1.000  -0.408  0.079  0.000 
Note: Coefficients in bold type have posterior inclusion probability higher than 0.5 
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Figure A1: Inclusion of Variables in 1,000 Best Models in 3Year Lag Dynamic Specification 
Model Inclusion Based on Best  1000  Models
Cumulative Model Probabilities
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Table A3: Dynamic BMA with Variables Lagged by 6 Years 
   PIP  Post Mean  Post SD   Pos. Sign 
Crisis Incidence Index      
hp_cii_L4  1.000 0.339 0.019 1.000 
Monetary policy stance      
st_neer_L24 0.011  -0.001  0.008  0.005 
st_m1_L24  0.005 0.000 0.005 0.988 
st_mmrate_L24  0.018 0.002 0.020 0.939 
Interest rates             
st_lenrate_L24  0.006 0.000 0.007 0.983 
st_deprate_L24  0.006 0.000 0.006 0.964 
st_govtbond_L24  0.006 0.000 0.006 0.990 
Banking system situation             
st_termspread_L24 0.952 -0.176 0.059  0.000 
st_debtcreditspread_L24  0.007 0.000 0.005 1.000 
st_bankcapratio_L24 0.007 0.000 0.003 1.000 
st_bankliqratio_L24 0.009 -0.001  0.008 0.000 
st_nonperfloans_L24  0.005 0.000 0.003 1.000 
Capital market situation             
st_mktcap_L24 0.034  -0.006  0.038  0.000 
st_shareprice_L24  0.462 0.127 0.154 1.000 
st_equityreturns_L24  0.039 0.005 0.031 0.985 
Money and credit             
st_m2_L24 0.010  -0.001  0.010  0.000 
st_m3_L24  0.005 0.000 0.005 0.997 
st_domprivcredit_L24  0.006 0.000 0.005 0.000 
Debts and savings             
st_govtdebt_L24 0.063  -0.009  0.039  0.000 
st_hhdebt_L24  0.184 0.033 0.076 1.000 
st_netsavings_L24  0.007 0.000 0.008 0.026 
st_grosssavings_L24 0.008 -0.001 0.009 0.001 
External debt             
st_foreignliab_L24  1.000 0.882 0.091 1.000 
st_nfa_L24 0.045  -0.005  0.025  0.000 
st_foreigndebt_L24  0.050 0.006 0.028 1.000 
Housing prices             
st_residcapform_L24  0.004 0.000 0.003 0.121 
st_houseprices_L24 0.010  -0.001  0.010  0.001 
st_aggassetprices_L24  0.847 0.330 0.171 1.000 
Real economy             
st_indprodch_L24  0.008 0.000 0.006 0.000 
st_hhcons_L24  0.018 0.001 0.013 1.000 
st_capform_L24  0.004 0.000 0.004 0.109 
st_indshare_L24 0.017  -0.003  0.028  0.306 
st_servshare_L24  0.986 0.357 0.087 1.000    Early Warning Indicators of Economic Crises: 




st_trade_L24  0.009 0.001 0.010 1.000 
Fiscal stance             
st_govtcons_L24  0.005 0.000 0.003 0.830 
st_taxburden_L24  0.020 0.001 0.009 1.000 
External balance             
st_curaccount_ifs_L24  0.016 0.001 0.014 1.000 
st_trbalance_L24  0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 
st_reer_L24 0.032  -0.003  0.018  0.000 
st_fdiinflow_L24 0.014  -0.001  0.012  0.000 
st_fdioutflow_L24 0.024  -0.003  0.019  0.000 
Global variables             
st_termsoftrade_L24 0.251 -0.039  0.072 0.000 
st_wrgdp_L24  0.975 0.295 0.089 1.000 
st_wtrade_L24  0.959 0.411 0.139 1.000 
st_winf_L24 1.000  -0.594  0.059  0.000 
st_wcreditpriv_L24 1.000 0.489 0.088 1.000 
st_wfdiinflow_L24 1.000  -0.653  0.079  0.000 
st_wexpprice_L24  0.968 0.259 0.082 1.000 
Inflation             
st_inflation_L24 0.009  -0.001  0.008  0.000 
Commodity prices             
st_comprice_L24 0.175  -0.051  0.120  0.000 
Note: Coefficients in bold type have posterior inclusion probability higher than 0.5   70  Jan Babecký, Tomáš Havránek, Jakub Matějů, 
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Figure A2: Inclusion of Variables in 1,000 Best Models in 6 Year Lag Dynamic Specification 
Model Inclusion Based on Best  1000  Models
Cumulative Model Probabilities
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ANNEX V: Predicting Crisis Incidence: Model Performance 
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ANNEX VI: Contents of Online Appendix Available at 
http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/en/node/372  
 
Detailed results for 40 countries: 
CII_model_fit\       - plots of in-sample and out-of-sample model fit  
CII_plots\         - plots of the CII  
COI_model_fit\       - plots of in-sample and out-of-sample model fit  
COI_plots\         - plots of the COI 
 
Panel VAR impulse responses for the whole panel of 40 countries: 
Optimal_lags_PVAR\    - plots of bivariate (CII, each predictor) PVAR impulse 
responses for lag selection (note: hp_cii_neg is the CII, 
st_XX is leading indicator XX) 
Policy_simulations_PVAR\  - plots of bivariate (CII/EWI, each policy variable) PVAR 
impulse responses for assessment of CII/EWI response to 
each policy variable (note: hp_cii_neg is the CII, EWI is 
the EWI, st_YY is policy variable YY) 
 
Anonymized database of crises (COI): 
CDEC40_40_AT_LEAST_TWO.xls   Crisis occurrence = 1 if at least two of the sources agree on 
the occurrence of a crisis (e.g. a country expert and at 
least one research paper, or at least two research papers); 
0 otherwise  
 
 CNB WORKING PAPER SERIES 






Early warning indicators of economic crises:  
Evidence from a panel of 40 developed countries 
 
7/2011 Tomáš  Havránek 
Zuzana Iršová 
Determinants of horizontal spillovers from FDI: Evidence from a 
large meta-analysis 
6/2011 Roman  Horváth 
Jakub Matějů 
How are inflation targets set? 
5/2011 Bořek Vašíček  Is monetary policy in the new EU member states asymmetric? 
4/2011 Alexis  Derviz  Financial frictions, bubbles, and macroprudential policies 
3/2011 Jaromír  Baxa 
Roman Horváth 
Bořek Vašíček 
Time-varying monetary-policy rules and financial stress: 
Does financial instability matter for monetary policy? 
 
2/2011 Marek  Rusnák 
Tomáš Havránek 
Roman Horváth 
How to solve the price puzzle? A meta-analysis 
1/2011 Jan  Babecký 
Aleš Bulíř 
Kateřina Šmídková 
Sustainable real exchange rates in the new EU member states:  
What did the Great Recession change? 
15/2010 Ke  Pang 
Pierre L. Siklos 
Financial frictions and credit spreads 
14/2010 Filip  Novotný 
Marie Raková 
Assessment of consensus forecasts accuracy: The Czech National 
Bank perspective 
13/2010 Jan  Filáček 
Branislav Saxa 
Central bank forecasts as a coordination device 




Short-term forecasting of Czech quarterly GDP using monthly 
indicators 
11/2010 Roman  Horváth 
Kateřina Šmídková 
Jan Zápal 
Central banks´ voting records and future policy 
10/2010 Alena  Bičáková 
Zuzana Prelcová 
Renata Pašaličová 
Who borrows and who may not repay? 
9/2010 Luboš  Komárek 
Jan Babecký 
Zlatuše Komárková 
Financial integration at times of financial instability 
8/2010 Kamil  Dybczak 
Peter Tóth 
David Voňka 
Effects of price shocks to consumer demand. Estimating the 
QUAIDS demand system on Czech Household Budget Survey data 
 
7/2010  Jan Babecký  




The margins of labour cost adjustment: Survey evidence from 
European Firms  Tairi Rõõm 
6/2010 Tomáš  Havránek 
Roman Horváth 
Jakub Matějů 
Do financial variables help predict macroeconomic environment? 
The case of the Czech Republic 
5/2010 Roman  Horváth 
Luboš Komárek 
Filip Rozsypal 
Does money help predict inflation? An empirical assessment for 
Central Europe 




A Gravity approach to modelling international trade in South-
Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States:  
The role of geography, policy and institutions 
3/2010 Tomáš  Havránek 
Zuzana Iršová 
Which foreigners are worth wooing? A Meta-analysis of vertical 
spillovers from FDI 
2/2010 Jaromír  Baxa 
Roman Horváth 
Bořek Vašíček 
How does monetary policy change? Evidence on inflation 
targeting countries 
1/2010 Adam  Geršl 
Petr Jakubík 
Relationship lending in the Czech Republic 
15/2009  David N. DeJong 
Roman Liesenfeld 




Efficient likelihood evaluation of state-space representations 
14/2009  Charles W. Calomiris  Banking crises and the rules of the game 
13/2009 Jakub  Seidler 
Petr Jakubík 
The Merton approach to estimating loss given default: Application 
to the Czech Republic 
12/2009 Michal  Hlaváček 
Luboš Komárek 
Housing price bubbles and their determinants in the Czech 
Republic and its regions 
11/2009 Kamil  Dybczak 
Kamil Galuščák 






















Nauro F. Campos 
Roman Horváth 
Percepion is always right: The CNB´s monetary policy in the 
media 
 
Funding costs and loan pricing by multinational bank affiliates 
 
Heterogeneity in bank pricing policies: The Czech evidence 
 
The impact of early retirement incentives on labour market 
participation: Evidence from a parametric change in the Czech 
Republic 
Reform redux: Measurement, determinants and reversals 
 
5/2009 Kamil  Galuščák  





The determination of wages of newly hired employees: Survey 
evidence on internal versus external factors 4/2009  Jan Babecký  





Downward nominal and real wage rigidity: Survey evidence from 
European firms 
3/2009 Jiri  Podpiera 
Laurent Weill 
Measuring excessive risk-taking in banking 




Implementing the new structural model of the Czech National Bank
 
1/2009 Kamil  Dybczak 
Jan Babecký 
The impact of population ageing on the Czech economy 
14/2008  Gabriel Fagan  
Vitor Gaspar 
Macroeconomic adjustment to monetary union 
13/2008  Giuseppe Bertola  
Anna Lo Prete  
Openness, financial markets, and policies: Cross-country and 
dynamic patterns 
12/2008 Jan  Babecký 
Kamil Dybczak  
Kamil Galuščák 
Survey on wage and price formation of Czech firms 
11/2008 Dana  Hájková  The measurement of capital services in the Czech Republic 
10/2008 Michal  Franta  Time aggregation bias in discrete time models of aggregate 
duration data  
9/2008 Petr  Jakubík 
Christian Schmieder 
Stress testing credit risk: Is the Czech Republic different from 
Germany? 
8/2008 Sofia  Bauducco 
Aleš Bulíř 
Martin Čihák 
Monetary policy rules with financial instability 
 
7/2008 Jan  Brůha 
Jiří Podpiera 
The origins of global imbalances 
6/2008 Jiří Podpiera 
Marie Raková 
The price effects of an emerging retail market  
 
5/2008 Kamil  Dybczak 
David Voňka 
Nico van der Windt 
The effect of oil price shocks on the Czech economy 
 
4/2008  Magdalena M. Borys 
Roman Horváth 
The effects of monetary policy in the Czech Republic: 
An empirical study 
3/2008 Martin  Cincibuch 
Tomáš Holub 
Jaromír Hurník 
Central bank losses and economic convergence 
 
2/2008 Jiří Podpiera  Policy rate decisions and unbiased parameter estimation in 





Determinants of house prices in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
17/2007 Pedro  Portugal  U.S. unemployment duration: Has long become longer or short 
become shorter? 
16/2007  Yuliya Rychalovská   Welfare-based optimal monetary policy in a two-sector small open 
economy 15/2007 Juraj  Antal 
František Brázdik 
The effects of anticipated future change in the monetary policy 
regime 




Inflation targeting and communication: Should the public read 
inflation reports or tea leaves? 
13/2007 Martin  Cinncibuch 
Martina Horníková 
Measuring the financial markets' perception of EMU enlargement: 
The role of ambiguity aversion 
12/2007 Oxana  Babetskaia-
Kukharchuk 
Transmission of exchange rate shocks into domestic inflation: The 
case of the Czech Republic 
11/2007 Jan  Filáček  Why and how to assess inflation target fulfilment 
10/2007 Michal  Franta 
Branislav Saxa 
Kateřina Šmídková 
Inflation persistence in new EU member states: Is it different than 
in the Euro area members? 
9/2007 Kamil  Galuščák 
Jan Pavel 
Unemployment and inactivity traps in the Czech Republic: 
Incentive effects of policies 
8/2007 Adam  Geršl 
Ieva Rubene  
Tina Zumer 
Foreign direct investment and productivity spillovers:  
Updated evidence from Central and Eastern Europe 
7/2007  Ian Babetskii  
Luboš Komárek  
Zlatuše Komárková 
Financial integration of stock markets among new EU member 
states and the euro area 




Market power and efficiency in the Czech banking sector 
 
5/2007 Jiří Podpiera 
Laurent Weill 
Bad luck or bad management? Emerging banking market 
experience 
4/2007 Roman  Horváth  The time-varying policy neutral rate in real time: A predictor for 
future inflation? 
3/2007 Jan  Brůha 
Jiří Podpiera  
Stanislav Polák 
The convergence of a transition economy:  
The case of the Czech Republic 
 
2/2007  Ian Babetskii  
Nauro F. Campos 
Does reform work? 
An econometric examination of the reform-growth puzzle 
1/2007 Ian  Babetskii 
Fabrizio Coricelli 
Roman Horváth  
Measuring and explaining inflation persistence: 
Disaggregate evidence on the Czech Republic  
 
13/2006  Frederic S. Mishkin  
Klaus Schmidt-
Hebbel 
Does inflation targeting make a difference? 
 
12/2006 Richard  Disney 
Sarah Bridges 
John Gathergood  
Housing wealth and household indebtedness: Is there a household 
‘financial accelerator’? 




Measures of potential output from an estimated  
DSGE model of the United States 
10/2006 Jiří Podpiera 
Marie Raková  
Degree of competition and export-production relative prices  
when the exchange rate changes: Evidence from a panel of Czech   exporting companies 
9/2006 Alexis  Derviz 
Jiří Podpiera 
Cross-border lending contagion in multinational banks 
8/2006 Aleš  Bulíř 
Jaromír Hurník 
The Maastricht inflation criterion: “Saints” and “Sinners” 
7/2006 Alena  Bičáková 
Jiří Slačálek 
Michal Slavík 
Fiscal implications of personal tax adjustments in the Czech 
Republic 
6/2006 Martin  Fukač 
Adrian Pagan 
Issues in adopting DSGE models for use in the policy process 
5/2006 Martin  Fukač  New Keynesian model dynamics under heterogeneous expectations 
and adaptive learning 
4/2006 Kamil  Dybczak 
Vladislav Flek 
Dana Hájková  
Jaromír Hurník 
Supply-side performance and structure in the Czech Republic 
(1995–2005) 
3/2006 Aleš  Krejdl  Fiscal sustainability – definition, indicators and assessment of 
Czech public finance sustainability 
2/2006 Kamil  Dybczak  Generational accounts in the Czech Republic 
1/2006 Ian  Babetskii  Aggregate wage flexibility in selected new EU member states 
14/2005  Stephen G. Cecchetti  The brave new world of central banking: The policy challenges 
posed by asset price booms and busts 
13/2005  Robert F. Engle 
Jose Gonzalo Rangel 
The spline GARCH model for unconditional volatility and its 
global macroeconomic causes 
12/2005  Jaromír Beneš  
Tibor Hlédik  
Michael Kumhof 
David Vávra 
An economy in transition and DSGE: What the Czech national 
bank’s new projection model needs 
11/2005 Marek  Hlaváček 
Michael Koňák  
Josef Čada 
The application of structured feedforward neural networks to the 
modelling of daily series of currency in circulation 
10/2005 Ondřej Kameník  Solving SDGE models: A new algorithm for the sylvester equation 
9/2005  Roman Šustek  Plant-level nonconvexities and the monetary transmission 
mechanism 
8/2005 Roman  Horváth  Exchange rate variability, pressures and optimum currency 
area criteria: Implications for the central and eastern european 
countries 
7/2005  Balázs Égert 
Luboš Komárek 
Foreign exchange interventions and interest rate policy  
in the Czech Republic: Hand in glove? 
6/2005 Anca  Podpiera 
Jiří Podpiera 
Deteriorating cost efficiency in commercial banks signals an 
increasing risk of failure  
5/2005  Luboš Komárek 
Martin Melecký 
The behavioural equilibrium exchange rate of the Czech koruna
4/2005  Kateřina Arnoštová 
Jaromír Hurník  
The monetary transmission mechanism in the Czech Republic 
(evidence from VAR analysis) 
3/2005  Vladimír Benáček 
Jiří Podpiera  
Determining factors of Czech foreign trade: A cross-section time 
series perspective  Ladislav Prokop 
2/2005 Kamil  Galuščák 
Daniel Münich 
Structural and cyclical unemployment: What can we derive 
from the matching function? 
1/2005 Ivan  Babouček 
Martin Jančar 
Effects of macroeconomic shocks to the quality of the aggregate 
loan portfolio 
10/2004 Aleš  Bulíř 
Kateřina Šmídková 
Exchange rates in the new EU accession countries: What have 
we learned from the forerunners 
9/2004 Martin  Cincibuch 
Jiří Podpiera 
Beyond Balassa-Samuelson: Real appreciation in tradables in 
transition countries 
8/2004 Jaromír  Beneš 
David Vávra 
Eigenvalue decomposition of time series with application to the 
Czech business cycle 
7/2004  Vladislav Flek, ed.  Anatomy of the Czech labour market: From over-employment to 
under-employment in ten years? 
6/2004 Narcisa  Kadlčáková 
Joerg Keplinger 
Credit risk and bank lending in the Czech Republic 
5/2004 Petr  Král  Identification and measurement of relationships concerning 
inflow of FDI: The case of the Czech Republic 
4/2004 Jiří Podpiera  Consumers, consumer prices and the Czech business cycle 
identification 
3/2004 Anca  Pruteanu  The role of banks in the Czech monetary policy transmission 
mechanism 
2/2004 Ian  Babetskii  EU enlargement and endogeneity of some OCA criteria: 
Evidence from the CEECs 
1/2004 Alexis  Derviz 
Jiří Podpiera 
Predicting bank CAMELS and S&P ratings: The case of the 
Czech Republic 
 
CNB RESEARCH AND POLICY NOTES 




Price-level targeting – A real alternative to inflation targeting? 
1/2008 Nicos  Christodoulakis  Ten years of EMU: Convergence, divergence and new policy 
prioritie 
2/2007  Carl E. Walsh   Inflation targeting and the role of real objectives  
1/2007 Vojtěch Benda 
Luboš Růžička 
Short-term forecasting methods based on the LEI approach: The 
case of the Czech Republic 
2/2006 Garry  J.  Schinasi  Private finance and public policy 
1/2006 Ondřej Schneider  The EU budget dispute – A blessing in disguise? 
5/2005  Jan Stráský  Optimal forward-looking policy rules in the quarterly projection 
model of the Czech National Bank 
4/2005 Vít  Bárta  Fulfilment of the Maastricht inflation criterion by  
the Czech Republic: Potential costs and policy options 
3/2005 Helena  Sůvová 
Eva Kozelková 
Eligibility of external credit assessment institutions  David Zeman 
Jaroslava Bauerová 
 
2/2005 Martin  Čihák 
Jaroslav Heřmánek 
Stress testing the Czech banking system:  
Where are we? Where are we going? 
1/2005 David  Navrátil 
Viktor Kotlán 
The CNB’s policy decisions – Are they priced in by the markets?
4/2004 Aleš  Bulíř  External and fiscal sustainability of the Czech economy:   
A quick look through the IMF’s night-vision goggles 
3/2004 Martin  Čihák  Designing stress tests for the Czech banking system 
2/2004 Martin  Čihák  Stress testing: A review of key concepts 
1/2004 Tomáš  Holub  Foreign exchange interventions under inflation targeting: 
The Czech experience 
     
CNB ECONOMIC RESEARCH BULLETIN 
April 2011  Monetary policy analysis in a central bank 
November 2010  Wage adjustment in Europe 
May 2010  Ten years of economic research in the CNB 
November 2009  Financial and global stability issues 
May 2009  Evaluation of the fulfilment of the CNB’s inflation targets 1998–2007 
December 2008  Inflation targeting and DSGE models 
April 2008  Ten years of inflation targeting 
December 2007  Fiscal policy and its sustainability 
August 2007  Financial stability in a transforming economy   
November 2006  ERM II and euro adoption 
August 2006  Research priorities and central banks 
November 2005  Financial stability 
May 2005  Potential output 
October 2004  Fiscal issues 
May 2004  Inflation targeting 

















































Czech National Bank 
Economic Research Department 
Na Příkopě 28, 115 03 Praha 1 
Czech Republic 
phone: +420 2 244 12 321 
fax: +420 2 244 14 278 
http://www.cnb.cz 
e-mail: research@cnb.cz 
ISSN 1803-7070 